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IF YOU SPEAK UP, MUST YOU STAND DOWN: 
CAPERTON AND ITS LIMITS 
Richard M. Esenberg*
. . . The hungry Judges soon the Sentence sign, 
And Wretches hang that Jury-men may Dine . . . .1
INTRODUCTION 
The idea of judicial impartiality is an old one.  Chief Justice of 
the Indiana Supreme Court Randall Shepard reminds us that, in the 
book of Deuteronomy, Moses is said to have instructed judges of the 
tribes of Israel that they “‘shalt not respect persons’” nor “‘take a 
gift; for a gift doth blind the eyes of the wise, and pervert the words 
of the righteous.’”2  The author of Leviticus cautions that “you shall 
not be partial to the poor or defer to the great, but in righteousness 
shall you judge your neighbor.”3  King Alfred the Great required not 
only that magistrates be literate, but regarded judges who “slay folk 
by false judgments” to be guilty of homicide.4  In one year, he had 
forty-four judges hanged for such false judgments.5  The Lex 
Visigothorum (Visigothic Code) required that judges who had ruled 
falsely due, not to ignorance, but to partiality, cupidity, or for the 
sake of profit would be required to make restitution to the wronged 
party.6  If unable to make restitution, the judge was to “be delivered 
as a slave to him to whom he is indebted, or, after having been 
exposed in public . . . receive fifty lashes.”7
 * Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. 
 1. ALEXANDER POPE, The Rape of the Lock, in 2 POEMS OF ALEXANDER 
POPE: THE RAPE OF THE LOCK AND OTHER POEMS 144, 170 (Geoffrey Tillotson ed., 
Routledge 1993) (1940). 
 2. Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech Restraint and Liberty in 
Judicial Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1059, 1060–61 (1996) (quoting 
Deuteronomy 16:19 (King James)). 
 3. Leviticus 19:15 (Revised Standard Version). 
 4. Shepard, supra note 2, at 1061 n.3 (quoting THE MIRROR OF JUSTICES 
166 (William Joseph Whitaker ed., 1895)). 
 5. Id. 
 6. THE VISIGOTHIC CODE bk. II, tit. I, ¶ XIX, at 28 (S.P. Scott ed. & trans., 
1910). 
 7. Id.; accord M.H. Hoeflich, Regulation of Judicial Misconduct from Late 
Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, 2 LAW & HIST. REV. 79, 92 (1984) (citing 
provisions of the Visigothic Code that punish judicial misconduct such as 
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In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,8 the Supreme Court 
considered a less extreme approach to the problem of judicial bias.  
The Court has long recognized that the constitutional guarantee of 
due process may require recusal of judges holding an interest in the 
outcome of a case.9  But prior to Caperton, the application of this 
requirement had been limited to cases in which a judge had an 
individual or official pecuniary interest in the outcome of a case10 or 
was, in some sense, acting as both the judge and prosecutor.11  
Caperton moved beyond this, declaring a generalized due process 
duty to recuse in circumstances in which a judge has an interest 
that creates an “unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’”12  A five-to-
four majority held that a successful judicial candidate’s potential 
“debt of gratitude” to a corporate litigant whose CEO had spent a 
large amount of money in support of his election required recusal.13
The majority and dissent disagreed about whether the decision 
would launch satellite litigation seeking recusal of judges.14  They 
also disagreed over the need for a more specific standard.15  In my 
view, there is more potential for mischief than the majority 
recognized.  The absence of clear guidance may very well lead 
bribery). 
 8. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
 9. Id. at 2259–62. 
 10. Id. at 2259–61; see, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 
816–17, 820–25 (1986) (finding a due process violation when an Alabama 
Supreme Court Justice sat on a case while he was the lead plaintiff in a nearly 
identical case pending in the state’s lower courts); Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, 
409 U.S. 57, 57–62 (1972) (finding a due process violation when the mayor, who 
was in charge of revenue production and law enforcement, sat in judgment of 
the petitioner who had been charged with two traffic offenses, the funds of 
which would go to the municipal coffers); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 514–20, 
531–32 (1927) (finding a due process violation when a mayor served as village 
judge and received supplemental pay from fines he imposed). 
 11. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2261–62; see, e.g., Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 
400 U.S. 455, 466 (1971) (“[A] defendant in criminal contempt proceedings 
should be given a public trial before a judge other than the one reviled by the 
contemnor.”); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 134–35, 139 (1955) (holding that 
the petitioner’s due process rights were violated when the trial judge 
participated in the charging decision). 
 12. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2262. 
 13. Id. at 2256, 2262, 2265–67. 
 14. See id. at 2265 (“Massey and its amici predict that various adverse 
consequences will follow from recognizing a constitutional violation here—
ranging from a flood of recusal motions to unnecessary interference with 
judicial elections.  We disagree.”); id. at 2274 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“But I 
believe that opening the door to recusal claims under the Due Process 
Clause . . . will itself bring our judicial system into undeserved disrepute, and 
diminish the confidence of the American people in the fairness and integrity of 
their courts.”); id. at 2274 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he principal consequence 
of today’s decision is to create vast uncertainty with respect to a point of law 
that can be raised in all litigated cases in (at least) those 39 States that elect 
their judges.”). 
 15. Id. at 2267–69 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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litigants to play the Caperton card, particularly in high-profile cases 
before multimember appellate courts.  This may well, as the dissent 
feared, disrupt the operation of state courts and undermine the 
public confidence in the judicial process that the majority sought to 
preserve.16
While Caperton itself provides little guidance, it is highly 
unlikely that the Court intended to usher in a constitutionally 
mandated regime of aggressive recusal requirements.  The Court 
repeatedly referred to the facts before it as “rare,” “extraordinary,” 
and “extreme.”17  I argue that Caperton’s scope and likely 
application can be informed by the Court’s recent decisions on 
judicial campaign speech and campaign finance regulation.  These 
cases suggest some limits on a due process duty of recusal that 
Caperton itself did not provide.  Part I of this Article considers the 
Caperton case and the likelihood that it will have legs, leading to 
more frequent attempts by litigants to seek the recusal of potentially 
“unfriendly” judges.  Part II examines the Court’s recent cases on 
judicial campaign speech and campaign finance regulation, 
attempting to discern what those cases mean for the interplay 
between the right of free speech in judicial campaigns and the desire 
for judicial impartiality.  Part III suggests some potential guidelines 
for the application of Caperton. 
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that the problems 
discussed here are most salient with respect to multimember law-
developing courts.  Candidates and aspirants to such courts are 
most likely to attract the type of support or to engage in the type of 
 16. Id. at 2267, 2274. 
 17. See, e.g., id. at 2256 (“[Justice Benjamin] received campaign 
contributions in an extraordinary amount from, and through the efforts of, 
[litigant].”); id. at 2262 (“Though not a bribe or criminal influence, Justice 
Benjamin would nevertheless feel a debt of gratitude to [litigant] for his 
extraordinary efforts to get him elected.”); id. at 2263 (“Not every campaign 
contribution by a litigant or attorney creates a probability of bias that requires 
a judge’s recusal, but this is an exceptional case.”); id. at 2265 (“[T]he fact 
remains that [litigant’s] extraordinary contributions were made at a time when 
he had a vested stake in the outcome [of his pending case].”); id. (“On these 
extreme facts the probability of actual bias rises to an unconstitutional level.”); 
id. (“Our decision today addresses an extraordinary situation where the 
Constitution requires recusal.”); id. (“The facts now before us are extreme by 
any measure.”); id. (“It is true that extreme cases often test the bounds of 
established legal principles . . . .  But it is also true that extreme cases are more 
likely to cross constitutional limits . . . .”); id. at 2265–66 (“In each [prior 
recusal] case the Court dealt with extreme facts that created an 
unconstitutional probability of bias . . . .  The Court was careful to distinguish 
the extreme facts of the cases before it from those interests that would not rise 
to a constitutional level.”); id. at 2266 (recognizing that the Court was not 
“flooded” with motions after the prior recusal cases, which was “perhaps due in 
part to the extreme facts those standards sought to address”); id. at 2267 
(holding that litigant’s contributions presented one of the  “rare instances” that 
requires judicial recusal). 
W04_ESENBERG 11/11/2010  11:44:12 PM 
1290 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
 
debate that may lead to calls for recusals.  At the same time, 
recusal—by disabling those chosen by the electorate or the 
appointing authorities from participation in the law-development 
process—may create greater tensions between rights of free speech 
and association and the logic of the applicable judicial selection 
mechanism. 
I.  CAPERTON V. A.T. MASSEY COAL CO. 
Some have seen Caperton as an instance of life imitating art18—
in this case, John Grisham’s novel The Appeal, in which shady 
corporate interests locate and support a Manchurian candidate for 
the Mississippi Supreme Court who will rule in their favor in a 
pending case.19  While the comparison may be closer in legend than 
reality, Caperton was—in many respects—an extraordinary case. 
A. The Caperton Result 
A jury had “found . . . A.T. Massey Coal Co. and its 
affiliates . . . liable for fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment, 
and tortuous interference with existing contractual relations.”20  It 
awarded plaintiffs fifty million dollars in damages.21
After the verdict, but before the appeal, Justice Warren 
McGraw ran for reelection to the West Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals.22  He was opposed by a Charleston attorney named Brent 
Benjamin.23  Don Blankenship, CEO of Massey, heavily supported 
Benjamin’s challenge.  In addition to the maximum legal 
contribution of one thousand dollars to the Benjamin campaign 
itself, Blankenship independently spent half-a-million dollars in 
support of Benjamin’s candidacy.24  Most significantly, Blankenship 
donated nearly two-and-a-half million dollars to “And For The Sake 
Of The Kids,” an independent political organization formed under 26 
U.S.C. § 527 that supported Benjamin.  Blankenship’s contribution 
constituted over two-thirds of the total amount raised by the 
organization.25  His three million dollars in aggregate contributions 
and expenditures “[was] more than the total amount spent by all 
other Benjamin supporters and three times the amount spent by 
Benjamin’s own committee.”26  It was alleged that “Blankenship 
spent $1 million more than the total amount spent by the campaign 
 18. Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Case with the Feel of a Best Seller, USA 
TODAY (Feb. 16, 2009), http://www.usatoday.com/news/Washington/2009-02-16 
-grisham-court_N.htm. 
 19. Id.  See generally JOHN GRISHAM, THE APPEAL (2008). 
 20. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257 (majority opinion). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
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committees of both candidates combined.”27
Benjamin won the election with a bit more than 53% of the 
vote.28  While the proceedings in Massey’s appeal in the Caperton 
case were complicated, the bottom line is that Benjamin refused to 
recuse himself and voted with the majority as the verdict against 
Massey was overturned by a three-to-two vote.29  The Caperton 
plaintiffs sought review in the U.S. Supreme Court, alleging that 
their due process rights had been violated.30  The Court granted 
review and, by a five-to-four vote, reversed the decision of the West 
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.31
As noted above, although the Court repeatedly referred to the 
facts before it as “rare,” “extraordinary,” and “extreme,”32 it 
announced a broadly formulated due process right, suggesting that 
courts must undertake an inquiry to determine “whether the 
average judge in [the same] position is ‘likely’ to be neutral, or 
whether there is an unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’”33  This 
inquiry is designed to be objective, as the test of recusal is “not 
whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased.”34  Rather, recusal 
may be required when “‘under a realistic appraisal of psychological 
tendencies and human weakness,’ the interest ‘poses such a risk of 
actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the 
guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.’”35
In the context of a judicial election in which one party to the 
case is claimed to have supported a judicial candidate in a way that 
creates the appearance of bias, recusal may be constitutionally 
mandated when a contributor with a personal stake in a case “had a 
significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on 
the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign 
when the case was pending or imminent.”36
Applying that principle to the facts before it, the Court said that 
“[t]he inquiry centers on the contribution’s relative size in 
comparison to the total amount of money contributed to the 
campaign, the total amount spent in the election, and the apparent 
effect such contribution had on the outcome of the election.”37  In the 
case of Massey and Justice Benjamin, it concluded that, even if 
Blankenship’s support may not have been a necessary and sufficient 
 27. Id.  Exorbitant expenditures on judicial candidates are likely to become 
more and more common.  See infra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. 
 28. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257. 
 29. Id. at 2257–58. 
 30. Id. at 2259. 
 31. Id. at 2257–59. 
 32. See supra note 17. 
 33. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2262. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 2263 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). 
 36. Id. at 2263–64. 
 37. Id. at 2264. 
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cause of Justice Benjamin’s victory, its influence was “significant 
and disproportionate.”38  The Court emphasized “[t]he temporal 
relationship between the campaign contributions, the justice’s 
election, and the pendency of the case,” noting that “[a]lthough there 
is no allegation of a quid pro quo agreement, the fact remains that 
Blankenship’s extraordinary contributions were made at a time 
when he had a vested stake in the outcome.”39  Given the size of the 
contributions, they “would offer a possible temptation to the 
average . . . judge to . . . lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear 
and true.”40  In this case, Justice Benjamin—or, more accurately, a 
judge in Justice Benjamin’s position—would feel a debt of gratitude 
toward Blankenship for his extraordinary campaign efforts on his 
behalf. 
The Court stated that it did not expect a deluge of recusal 
motions,41 but it suggested no further limiting principles on the 
general due process duty of recusal.  Noting that a flood of recusal 
motions had not followed the Court’s earlier recusal decisions, 
Justice Kennedy observed that “[c]ourts proved quite capable of 
applying the standards to less extreme situations.”42  Because states 
can and do “‘adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due process 
requires,’” he expressed the view that “most disputes over 
disqualification will be resolved without resort to the Constitution” 
and that the standard adopted in Caperton will be “confined to rare 
instances.”43
In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts noted that, prior to Caperton, 
the Court had recognized only two instances in which due process 
might require recusal: “when the judge has a financial interest in 
the outcome of the case, and when the judge is trying a defendant 
for certain criminal contempts.”44  He criticized expansion of the 
requirement to a case in which the judge’s interest is more 
indirect.45  This, in his view, expanded the concept in a way not 
readily translated into a “judicially discernible and manageable 
standard.”46  He posed forty questions left unanswered by the 
majority opinion.47  Of course, few decisions of any significance fail 
to leave unanswered questions, and traditional judicial practice 
hesitates to decide more than is necessary to dispose of the case at 
 38. Id. at 2263–64. 
 39. Id. at 2264–65. 
 40. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 41. Id. at 2265. 
 42. Id. at 2266. 
 43. Id. at 2267 (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 
794 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 44. Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 2272.  “[T]he standard the majority articulates—‘probability of 
bias’—fails to provide clear, workable guidance for future cases.”  Id. at 2269. 
 47. Id. at 2269–72. 
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hand.  But, for the dissenters, the Court had provided no means by 
which these questions might be answered.48
Justice Scalia, writing separately, agreed with Chief Justice 
Roberts: 
What above all else is eroding public confidence in the Nation’s 
judicial system is the perception that litigation is just a game, 
that the party with the most resourceful lawyer can play it to 
win, that our seemingly interminable legal proceedings are 
wonderfully self-perpetuating but incapable of delivering real-
world justice.  The Court’s opinion will reinforce that 
perception, adding to the vast arsenal of lawyerly gambits 
what will come to be known as the Caperton claim.49
Chief Justice Roberts expressed his fear that “opening the door 
to recusal claims under the Due Process Clause, for an amorphous 
‘probability of bias,’ will itself bring our judicial system into 
undeserved disrepute, and diminish the confidence of the American 
people in the fairness and integrity of their courts.”50  He expressed 
the hope that he will be proven wrong.51
B. Caperton’s Future 
Time will tell whether Chief Justice Roberts’s fear or hope is 
realized.  There are reasons—based on Caperton’s rationale and the 
evolving character of judicial elections—to suspect that Caperton 
motions will be more prevalent than the majority assumed.  As 
several commentators have observed, Justice Kennedy may have 
been trying to resolve a “hard case” without making “bad law”52 by 
implying that the Caperton decision was “good-for-this-day-and-this-
train-only.”53  It may be that, for Justice Kennedy, the potential for 
bias is like pornography was for Justice Stewart—he knows it when 
he sees it.54  There are certainly times when such reasoning may be 
 48. Id. at 2267. 
 49. Id. at 2274 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 50. Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See, e.g., Stephen M. Hoersting & Bradley A. Smith, The Caperton 
Caper and the Kennedy Conundrum, 2009 CATO SUPREME CT. REV. 319, 319 
(“Caperton v. Massey Coal typifies the old maxim that hard cases make bad law.  
In Caperton, the Supreme Court created a new, largely unworkable standard 
for judicial recusal, then elevated it to a matter of constitutional due process.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 53. Pamela S. Karlan, Electing Judges, Judging Elections, and the Lessons 
of Caperton, 123 HARV. L. REV. 80, 94 (2009). 
 54. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) 
(“I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand 
to be embraced within [‘hard-core pornography’]; and perhaps I could never 
succeed in intelligibly doing so.  But I know it when I see it, and the motion 
picture involved in this case is not that.” (emphasis added)).  One of my 
copanelists at a conference held shortly after the issuance of Caperton 
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the best we can do.55
One commentator has argued that Caperton motions will be 
rare because they will largely be self-executing—a lawyer will be 
hesitant to file Caperton motions when a judge fails to voluntarily 
recuse himself because “the lawyer may safely assume that the 
judge is predisposed to deny the formal recusal motion.”56  Given 
Caperton’s emphasis of the “extreme” nature of its facts, success at 
the appellate level will be “rare.”57  Further, review of the failure of 
state supreme court justices to recuse themselves could only occur in 
the United States Supreme Court,58 an unlikely event given the 
rarity with which certiorari is granted.  All of this should add up to 
a reluctance of lawyers to play the recusal “gambit,” reflected in the 
adage that “[w]hen you strike at a king, you must kill him.”59
But it is far from clear that the Caperton facts were as extreme 
or unusual as the majority assumed them to be.  As the dissent and 
a number of commentators have observed, there were other large 
sums of money being spent on the Benjamin-McGraw race, much of 
it by interest groups who could be expected to have matters before 
the court.60  Although Blankenship’s spending may have helped 
suggested that Justice Benjamin’s failure to recuse himself was worthy of 
treatment on a recurrent segment on Saturday Night Live called “Really!?! with 
Seth & Amy” in which Seth Meyer and Amy Poehler make fun of what they 
take to be obviously poor decisions.  See, for example, the show’s treatment of 
Representative Joseph Wilson’s outburst during a speech to Congress by 
President Obama.  Saturday Night Live: Weekend Update: Thursday (NBC 
television broadcast Sept. 17, 2009), available at http://www.nbc.com/Saturday 
-night-live/video/update-thursday-part-3/1158379/?__cid=thefilter (“Hey, Joe!  
Yelling ‘You lie!’ would be rude to a valet or a waiter, so, maybe don’t yell it at 
the President!  Really!  And, also, next time, can I suggest ‘You’re a liar!’?  ‘You 
lie!’ sounds like a toddler or someone who just learned English.  I mean, 
really!”). 
 55. I have argued that this may be the only way to understand and apply 
the Supreme Court’s recent adoption of a “plausibility” standard for assessing 
the adequacy of pleadings under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009), and Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556–57 (2007).  See Richard Esenberg, To Iqbal 
or Not To Iqbal?, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 12, 2010, 9:52 AM), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/03/to-iqbal-or-not-to-iqbal.html.  
Additionally, similar reasoning has been adopted in at least one case in 
England.  See Cadogan v. Morris, [1998] EWCA (Civ) 1671 (Eng.) (referring to 
“the well known elephant test[, which] is difficult to describe, but you know it 
when you see it”). 
 56. Bruce A. Green, Fear of the Unknown: Judicial Ethics After Caperton, 
60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 229, 234–35 (2010). 
 57. Id. at 235. 
 58. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006). 
 59. Green, supra note 56, at 235 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Green 
attributes the quote to Ralph Waldo Emerson.  Id. at 235 & n.39.  A more 
modern version can be attributed to the character Omar Little in the HBO 
series The Wire.  The Wire: Lessons (HBO television broadcast July 28, 2002) 
(“Ayo.  Lesson here ‘Bey.  You come at the king, you best not miss.”). 
 60. See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2274 (2009) 
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Benjamin win, the race was not particularly close, and there were a 
myriad of other factors that could have led to Benjamin’s victory.61
In fact, the amount of money spent on state supreme court and 
other judicial races has been increasing exponentially.62  It is not at 
all unusual for discrete organizations—say plaintiffs’ lawyers, public 
employee unions, or insurance and business groups—to spend 
comparable sums on statewide races.63  If the Caperton motion is 
going to become, in Justice Scalia’s words, a “lawyerly gambit,”64 
contemporary judicial races seem likely to provide a target-rich 
environment. 
Although there are strategic reasons to avoid recusal motions,65 
lawyers may also rationally conclude that the likelihood of obtaining 
a particular judge’s vote is sufficiently remote that an attempt to 
remove her from the case is a better play.  This is particularly likely 
to be the case in multimember law-developing courts in which the 
outcome is less likely to be clear and the campaign cycle is more 
likely to have included the type of spending and advertising that 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“‘Consumers for Justice’—an independent group that 
received large contributions from the plaintiffs’ bar—spent approximately $2 
million in this race.”); Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Disqualification in the 
Aftermath of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 247, 275–
76 (2010) (listing various organizations that contributed money to defeat Justice 
McGraw). 
 61. See Andrew L. Frey & Jeffrey A. Berger, A Solution in Search of a 
Problem: The Disconnect Between the Outcome in Caperton and the 
Circumstances of Justice Benjamin’s Election, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 279, 282–85 
(2010) (attributing Benjamin’s victory to factors outside of solely financial 
support); Rotunda, supra note 60, at 272–76 (listing additional factors that 
contributed to Benjamin’s victory).  For example, Justice McGraw refused to 
grant media interviews or to debate his opponent.  Frey & Berger, supra, at 
284.  He gave a widely publicized speech that came to be known as the “Scream 
at Racine,” in which he claimed that Republicans, not Democrats, “gave” the 
electorate abortion and opposition to school prayer, and that the U.S. Supreme 
Court had “approved gay marriage.”  Rotunda, supra note 60, at 274–75.  Of 
those state newspapers that endorsed candidates for the office, all but one 
endorsed Benjamin.  Id. at 273. 
 62. See JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL 
ELECTIONS IN THE GREAT LAKES STATES, 2000–2008, at 3 (Jess Rutledge ed., 
2008) (“Between 1999 and 2007, candidates for America’s highest courts have 
raised over $165 million, a remarkable jump from the $62 million raised 
between 1993 and 1998.”); JAMES SAMPLE, DAVID POZEN & MICHAEL YOUNG, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, FAIR COURTS: SETTING RECUSAL STANDARDS 10 
(2008) (“Winning candidates who did not accept public financing raised an 
average of more than $650,000 in 2004, up 45% from 2002’s average of 
$450,000.”); David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 
265, 267–68 (2008) (“Contributions have skyrocketed; interest groups, political 
parties, and mass media advertising play an increasingly prominent role . . . .” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 63. SAMPLE, POZEN & YOUNG, supra note 62, at 10. 
 64. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2274 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 65. Kelly M. Falls, Note, A Quorum of One: Redefining Recusal Standards 
in the Federal Trade Commission, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 705, 714 (2006). 
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seems most likely to lead to a Caperton issue. 
1. Caperton Unbounded 
All Caperton tells us is that recusal may be constitutionally 
required whenever there is a “potential for bias” that, when viewed 
objectively, may cause a judge to fail to “hold the balance nice, clear 
and true.”  This is a rather protean standard,66 potentially 
applicable in a variety of ways.  It is unclear, for example, why 
Caperton’s standard would be limited only to large campaign 
expenditures or contributions by a particular litigant.  A successful 
judicial candidate might also be thought to owe a “debt of gratitude” 
to an advocacy organization or interest group that has made 
independent expenditures on her behalf and that, while not a party 
to a subsequent case, appears as an amicus or is otherwise strongly 
interested in the outcome.67  Given Justice Kennedy’s capacious 
standard, it is possible to argue that a “debt of gratitude” to an 
important supporter or group of supporters might be repaid not only 
by fealty to a position that serves a supporter’s pecuniary interest, 
but also his or her ideological interest.68  As we will see, there is 
more robust evidence that “ideological” or “political” interests affect 
judicial decision making—even when they are nothing more than a 
recognition of how the electorate might respond—more than 
contributions.69
Nor is it clear that support from an interest group must be 
formal, organized, or involve concerted or coordinated actions by the 
participants.  If a judicial candidate has enjoyed outsized support 
from trial lawyers or business executives, litigants might argue—
and a court might hold—that there is a “potential” for bias in favor 
 66. See Rotunda, supra note 60, at 256 (“Sometimes a judge must disqualify 
himself because of campaign contributions or independent expenditures by an 
individual who is not a lawyer or party before the Court but has an interest in a 
case that is before the court.  The question is when?  Caperton does not answer 
that with any precision, except to say that it all depends.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 67. Following the 2007 Supreme Court election in Wisconsin, there were 
motions and public calls for the recusal of newly elected Justice Annette Ziegler 
in a case addressing the applicability of the sales tax to “customized” software.  
See Editorial, Judicial Conflicts: Step Aside in this Case, MILWAUKEE J. 
SENTINEL, Nov. 29, 2007, at 12A.  Hundreds of millions of dollars were at stake.  
A business lobbyist group, known as Wisconsin Manufacturers Commerce 
(“WMC”), had spent over two million dollars in support of Justice Ziegler’s 
candidacy and had filed an amicus brief in the case.  Patrick Marley & Stacy 
Forster, Van Hollen Has Ties to Case: Business Lobby Spent Millions on 
Attorney General, Ziegler in Elections, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 30, 2007, 
at 1B.  Justice Ziegler declined to recuse herself and ultimately wrote the 
majority opinion in favor of the position supported by WMC.  Wis. Dep’t of 
Revenue v. Menasha Corp., 754 N.W.2d 95 (Wis. 2008). 
 68. See infra notes 84–95 and accompanying text (discussing the recusal 
motions filed against Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Michael Gableman as a 
result of his perceived ideological opposition to criminal defendants). 
 69. See infra notes 134–35 and accompanying text. 
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of the interests of a group that has disproportionately supported the 
candidate’s election.70
Like Chief Justice Roberts, we can go on.  There is no obvious 
reason why “debts of gratitude” must be limited to contributions and 
expenditures.  There are other forms of support that might come 
from a potential litigant or interested party—endorsements of law 
enforcement or the organizational efforts of unions and other 
advocacy organizations—that might be seen to offer comparable 
advantages to a favored candidate.71  Professors Stephen Hoersting 
and Bradley Smith argue that newspaper endorsements can be 
worth an increase in voter share of one to five percentage points.72  
Further, there may, in fact, be no need for “support” at all.  It seems 
just as plausible that a “potential for bias” may arise from a “desire 
for vengeance” against a candidate’s opponents as from a “debt of 
gratitude” to her supporters.73
Nor is it clear, under Caperton, that the due process problems 
that may be presented by support of a judicial aspirant are limited 
to elections.  Indeed, it seems plausible to believe that a “debt of 
gratitude” may be owed not only to those who have helped to elect a 
judge, but to those who have appointed him or helped to secure his 
appointment in states where that is the route to the bench.74
 70. For example, Texas Supreme Court races were often claimed to be 
tainted by large individual contributions from numerous plaintiffs’ lawyers.  See 
Brenda Sapino Jeffreys, Plaintiffs Firms Bow Out as Big Campaign Donors, 
TEX. LAW., Mar. 9, 1998, at 1. 
 71. See Hoersting & Smith, supra note 52, at 336 (“[Caperton’s] logic can be 
extended to find ‘bias’ in any of a range of other independent political activity, 
in multiple forms and from multiple actors, long recognized as vital to 
democracy.  A group of community organizers that work to get out the vote in 
neighborhoods that disproportionately support a candidate would ‘benefit’ that 
candidate and may make him ‘grateful.’”) 
 72. Id. at 337 & n.73. 
 73. See id. at 338 (“Whatever recusal standard would apply to Justice 
Benjamin would presumably apply equally to his opponent, for in a system of 
winner-take-all elections, whether the $3 million was spent independently to 
support the judicial candidate or to oppose him matters little to the perceived 
impartiality of the judge.”). 
 74. Even in states that elect their judiciary, many judges are initially 
appointed to fill a vacancy.  For example, in my home state of Wisconsin, 
Governor Jim Doyle appointed Louis Butler to replace Justice Diane Sykes, who 
had been confirmed as a judge of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.  It was 
widely speculated that Democrats agreed not to oppose Judge Sykes’s 
nomination because it would give Governor Doyle, a Democrat, an opportunity 
to appoint her replacement.  See Annie L. Owens, Comment, “All Politics Is 
Local”: The Politics of Merit-Based Federal Judicial Selection in Wisconsin, 88 
MARQ. L. REV. 1031, 1048–50 (2005).  At the time, the Governor wished to enter 
into amended compacts with Indian tribes to expand casino gaming and obtain 
badly needed revenue to balance the state’s budget.  See Editorial, Doyle’s Risky 
Casino Play, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 25, 2003, at 14A.  A recent four-to-
three decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court (with Justice Sykes in the 
majority) seemed to hold that the Governor’s ability to do so was severely 
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Although Professor Lawrence Lessig has argued that an 
“affinity” for the policies of, for example, the President who has 
appointed a judge is “different” from financial support and “is 
arguably part of the design of presidentially selected judges,”75 it 
may be equally true that an “affinity” for the policies (or views) of 
those who make up the coalitions and interests that elect a judge are 
part of the “design” of electing judges.  And just as disentangling the 
potential for an improper quid pro quo in the federal context (i.e., a 
judge who supports the position of the administration or party who 
appointed him for no reason other than “pay back”) is difficult in the 
appointment process, it may be equally difficult in the context of 
campaign support.76
What of speech by the candidate himself (e.g., a pledge to 
support law enforcement or to protect families from dangerous 
products or even to “end the practice of recognizing rights not 
expressly set forth in the Constitution”)?  Would such speech create 
a “potential for bias” because that candidate may not want to rule in 
a way that would be seen as inconsistent with prior statements?  
Does it matter if the speech is made outside the campaign context? 
Must there, in fact, be speech at all?  Reviewing the Court’s 
cases concerning judicial elections, Professor Pamela Karlan 
concludes that they recognize that structural features of judicial 
elections (including what candidates are permitted to say and who 
limited or prohibited by a recent constitutional amendment banning casino 
gaming.  See Panzer v. Doyle, 680 N.W.2d 666, 692–98 (Wis. 2004).  Following 
Justice Butler’s appointment, the court essentially reversed its decision in 
Panzer, permitting the Governor to agree to any amount of casino gaming as 
long as it was done by amending preexisting compacts.  Dairyland Greyhound 
Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 719 N.W.2d 408, 444 (Wis. 2006).  Although I have been 
critical of the Dairyland decision, see, e.g., RICK ESENBERG, A COURT UNBOUND? 
THE RECENT JURISPRUDENCE OF THE WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT 4 (2007), 
http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20070329_WisconsinWhitePaper.pdf, I would 
never suggest that Justice Butler failed to “hold the balance, nice, clear and 
true.”  Nevertheless, some may see something of a John Grisham plot here as 
well and argue that Justice Butler owed a “debt of gratitude” to the Governor 
that created a potential for bias in a case involving hundreds of millions of 
dollars in state revenue.  I raise the example to suggest that “appearances” can 
arise in many ways. 
 75. Lawrence Lessig, What Everybody Knows and What Too Few Accept, 
123 HARV. L. REV. 104, 110 (2009). 
 76. While Professor Lessig argues that there is no theory—or at least no 
theory that we are likely to accept —“that makes money even arguably relevant 
to the legal determinations of a court,” id., ruling in favor of the Governor’s or 
President’s position in gratitude for one’s appointment is no more relevant.  
Equally, money can be a proxy for support of a candidate’s judicial philosophy, 
just as appointment of a like-minded jurist can reflect an expectation of, but not 
a bargain for, desired results.  As we will see later, the potential for a quid pro 
quo may be more readily discerned in certain circumstances like those present 
in Caperton, i.e., outsized contributions (or expenditures) by an individual party 
in a very significant and imminent case.  But the principle announced by 
Justice Kennedy is not so limited. 
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supports each candidate) can affect electoral outcomes, and that 
electoral outcomes can affect adjudicatory results.77  There is ample 
evidence that electoral concerns can affect the outcomes of certain 
highly salient criminal cases without regard to anything said or any 
money spent on a campaign78  If this is so, and if Caperton means 
that it is a violation of due process to sit on a case in which the 
adjudicatory outcome may impact or have been impacted in some 
way by the electoral process and outcome, then “the logic of 
Caperton is far more destabilizing than the Court might have 
intended.”79  It may well “bring the Court onto a collision course 
with the practice of electing judges.”80  Although Professor Karlan 
has no doubt that courts will reject claims by criminal defendants 
that electoral pressures deprive them of due process, it will be due to 
pragmatism rather than principle.81  Caperton, she concludes, 
“cannot be so easily cabined.”82
2. Caperton on the Ground 
There are some early indications that recusal motions will be 
more prevalent than the Caperton majority assumed.  In my home 
state of Wisconsin, for example, there has been a series of motions—
some filed before Caperton—seeking the recusal of newly elected 
 77. Karlan, supra note 53, at 89. 
 78. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the 
Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in 
Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 793–94 (1995) (noting that while judges in 
elective jurisdictions are far more likely to override jury sentences of life to 
impose death sentences, in the one state with an appointed judiciary that 
permits judicial overrides, judges more often override death sentences to impose 
life sentences); Joseph R. Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A 
Judge’s Perspective on Judicial Retention Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969, 
1980 (1988) (noting the “substantial” risk that judges will “receive and act 
upon” the message “that if they want to avoid negative votes, it is best to 
produce results with which the voters will agree” and suggesting that that 
message may have influenced the decisions of two members of the California 
Supreme Court faced with retention votes); Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. 
Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?, 
48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 248 (2004) (concluding on the basis of an empirical 
analysis of sentencing practices in Pennsylvania that judges subject to retention 
elections imposed sentences for several serious crimes that were “significantly 
longer the closer the sentencing judge is to standing for reelection”); Nancy J. 
King, How Different Is Death?  Jury Sentencing in Capital and Non-Capital 
Cases Compared, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 195, 204–06 (2004) (discussing the 
effects of judicial elections on sentencing determinations). 
 79. Karlan, supra note 53, at 94.  More than one commentator has argued 
that judicial elections violate the due process rights of criminal defendants.  
See, e.g., Joanna Cohn Weiss, Note, Tough on Crime: How Campaigns for State 
Judiciary Violate Criminal Defendants’ Due Process Rights, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1101 (2006). 
 80. Karlan, supra note 53, at 92. 
 81. Id. at 93–94. 
 82. Id. at 93. 
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Justice Michael Gableman.83  These motions argue that certain 
advertisements and other communications by the Gableman 
campaign itself reflect—or create the potential for—an improper 
bias against criminal defendants.84  A much-publicized e-mail from a 
lawyer in the state public defenders office urged members of the 
defense bar to make similar motions.85
These motions have emphasized not merely the fact of 
substantial independent expenditures, but the nature of the 
message conveyed.  The advertisements attacked Gableman’s 
opponent for being soft on crime and having been a public defender, 
and praised candidate Gableman for his support of law enforcement 
and former service as a prosecutor.86  They criticized the outcome in 
certain cases in which Justice Butler had voted to uphold the claim 
of a criminal defendant.87  The motions were based not simply on 
Justice Gableman’s speech, but also on the speech of the groups 
supporting him.88  None of those groups have any stake in the 
criminal justice system other than that of any other group of 
 83. See State v. Allen, 778 N.W.2d 863, 887, 888 & n.85 (Wis. 2010) 
(describing a “cottage industry” of recusal motions that includes several motions 
filed against Justice Gableman).  Justice Gableman defeated incumbent Justice 
Louis Butler.  Michele Goodwin, Expressive Minimalism and Fuzzy Signals: 
The Judiciary and the Role of Law, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 19, 22 n.13 (2009).  By 
way of full disclosure, although I did not endorse Justice Gableman or 
contribute to or participate in his campaign, I commented frequently on issues 
in the race and was one of a group of critics of what we perceived to be the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court’s move away from traditional practices of judicial 
restraint.  See, e.g., ESENBERG, supra note 74.  Additionally, I recorded, without 
compensation, a video for the WMC in which I commented, not on the election, 
but on my views regarding the direction of the court.  See WMCMedia, 
Wisconsin Supreme Court Unbound: A Candid Conversation with Professor Rick 
Esenberg, YOUTUBE (Feb. 9, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v 
=w06ghIy6_0Q.  WMC ultimately used that video to raise funds for independent 
expenditures in support of Justice Gableman.  See, e.g., Issue Ads: The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court 2008: What Is at Stake for Wisconsin?, WMC, 
http://www.wmc.org/display.cfm?ID=1735 (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).  However, 
I refused to permit a request for funds to be embedded in the video itself.  As 
noted below, I also criticized a Gableman campaign advertisement that is 
featured prominently in the recusal motions—criticism that was, in fact, cited 
to the court in support of at least one of the motions.  See infra note 270. 
 84. For an example of a recusal motion, see Motion for Recusal of Justice 
Gableman on Constitutional Grounds, State v. Allen, 778 N.W.2d 863 (Wis. 
2010) (No. 2007AP795). 
 85. Lawyer: Justice Gableman Biased Against Defendants, FOX 21 NEWS, 
Oct. 26, 2009, http://www.fox21online.com/news/lawyer-justice-gableman-biased 
-against-defendants. 
 86. Wis. Judicial Comm’n v. Gableman (In re Judicial Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Gableman), 784 N.W.2d 631, 633 (Wis. 2010). 
 87. Id. at 634. 
 88. See, e.g., Motion for Recusal of Justice Gableman on Constitutional 
Grounds, supra note 84, at 27–28; see also Penny J. White, “The Appeal” to the 
Masses, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 251, 259 & n.70 (2008) (highlighting the speech 
used by third parties in Justice Gableman’s election). 
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concerned citizens.  The parties (all criminal defendants) filing these 
motions argue that Justice Gableman will feel a “debt of gratitude” 
that can only be repaid by ruling against the claims of criminal 
defendants.89  In other words, Justice Gableman will be biased by 
adhering to what appears to be, however crudely expressed, a 
political or legal view of the proper balance between the demands of 
public safety and the rights and interests of the accused.  This is 
indeed Caperton uncabined. 
I share Professor Karlan’s skepticism that such motions are 
likely to be successful.  But, in Wisconsin, they have not been 
denied.  Although Justice Gableman denied the motion in one of the 
cases, the full court deadlocked on whether it had the authority to 
order recusal of a peer justice.90  Three justices held that the court 
lacked such authority and three wanted more briefing and argument 
on the question.91  Because the court deadlocked, the motion was not 
granted.92
Commenting on Caperton, Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson (a 
member of the group that wanted more briefing and argument on 
the issue) suggested that it should not be treated as an “outlier” but 
as an “important statement about the constitutional requirement of 
fair tribunals.”93  She questioned whether “extreme facts” ought to 
be the appropriate standard.94  Justice David Prosser (a member of 
the group that believed the court lacked authority to order recusal) 
lamented that “[t]o date, the Caperton decision has had disastrous 
consequences for the Wisconsin Supreme Court.”95
As addressed more fully below, the Gableman motions, like 
Caperton itself, may address an “extreme” case,96 but as judicial 
 89. See, e.g., Motion for Recusal of Justice Gableman on Constitutional 
Grounds, supra note 84. 
 90. State v. Allen, 778 N.W.2d 863, 863 (Wis. 2010).  The Allen court also 
made clear that it regarded the motions as facially deficient, arguing that 
Caperton ought to be limited to allegations of a financial interest, bias for or 
against a particular litigant, or bias against a constitutionally protected class. 
See id. at 920–21 (Roggensack, J., concurring). 
 91. Compare id. at 889–90 (majority opinion) (showing three justices 
requesting additional briefs), with id. at 873 (showing three justices who believe 
the court lacks authority to determine recusal motions). 
 92. Id. at 863.  Additionally, although motions in other cases remain 
pending, it seems unlikely that any of them will be granted. 
 93. Id. at 880. 
 94. Id. at 886; accord id. (referring favorably to Justice Stevens’s view that 
a campaign promise to be “tough on crime” should require recusal, and that 
determining when ‘“tough on crime’ judicial electioneering” risks deprive a 
criminal defendant of due process is “[n]ot an easy question but an important 
one”). 
 95. Id. at 924 (Prosser, J., concurring). 
 96. A similarly “extreme” case occurred in Michigan when an attorney 
representing the plaintiff in a wrongful-death action moved to recuse all of the 
conservative members of the Michigan Supreme Court because of bias 
stemming from criticism that the attorney had directed toward each of the 
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races become, in the words of one commentator, “nastier, noisier, 
and costlier,”97 similar motions responding to either “tough on 
crime” or “populist” campaigning would not be surprising.  An early 
draft of a report of the American Bar Association’s Judicial 
Disqualification Project noted an increased willingness of judicial 
candidates to take positions on disputed legal issues and stated that: 
[O]ne might reasonably speculate that judicial candidates who 
seek voter support by taking firm positions on issues they are 
likely to decide as judges will be reluctant to disqualify 
themselves when those issues arise, insofar as the voters who 
supported them are, in effect, counting on their candidate to 
make decisions they were elected to make.98
II.  RECUSAL AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
In the past several years, the Court has recognized a robust 
right of free speech for judicial candidates.99  It has found an 
increasingly unfettered right for individuals and organizations to 
engage in independent communications with respect to elections or 
issues pertaining to elections.100  The Court has held that, at least 
under certain circumstances, the right to engage in electoral 
advocacy may not be burdened by state action designed to counter or 
diminish the impact of that communication.101  It is notable that in 
each of these cases, Justice Kennedy joined with the Caperton 
judges and ten-year-old critical statements made by one the judges.  Pellegrino 
v. AMPCO Sys. Parking, 777 N.W.2d 144 (Mich. 2010); see also Margaret Agius, 
Michigan Supreme Court Denies Fieger Motion for Disqualification, 
EXAMINER.COM (Jan. 30, 2010), http://www.examiner.com/x-14309-Detroit-Legal 
-News-Examiner~y2010m1d30-Michigan-Supreme-Court-denies-Fieger-motion 
-for-disqualification (discussing allegations of bias regarding three justices on 
the Michigan Supreme Court made by the plaintiff’s attorney).  The attorney 
even argued, in support of his motion, that the voting pattern of the justices 
reflected bias against his firm (i.e., they had not supported his clients’ 
positions).  Agius, supra.  Two of the justices denied the motions individually, 
and a third motion, filed after the court changed its rules to require recusal 
motions to be referred to the entire court, was denied by the remaining four 
justices.  Id. 
 97. Roy A. Schotland, Comment, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 150 
(1998). 
 98. Standing Comm. on Judicial Independence, Am. Bar Ass’n, Report of 
the Judicial Disqualification Project 46 (Sept. 2008) (unpublished draft), 
available at http://www.ajs.org/ethics/pdfs 
/ABAJudicialdisqualificationprojectreport.pdf. 
 99. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) 
(holding that a canon of judicial conduct that prohibits candidates for judicial 
election from announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues 
violates the First Amendment). 
 100. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 917 (2010); FEC v. 
Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 482 (2007). 
 101. See, e.g., Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2771–74 (2008). 
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dissenters in five-to-four decisions.102  It may be that Justice 
Kennedy’s emphasis on the sui generis nature of Caperton is, in the 
words of Hoersting and Smith, an attempt to “address a case that, 
on its facts, seemed to shock the conscience—without damaging 
Kennedy’s longstanding position in campaign finance cases that 
judicial elections are much like other elections, and that 
independent election expenditures enjoy the highest constitutional 
protection.”103  If that is so, then the limits of Caperton are found not 
in its facts or in Justice Kennedy’s repeated expressions of disbelief 
that such a thing could happen or is likely ever to happen again, but 
in the Court’s own free speech doctrine.  Caperton may not be 
limited to a single train on a single day, but it ought not to be 
applied expansively. 
A. Speech Rights for Judicial Candidates 
1. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White 
The most important of the judicial-speech-rights cases is 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White104 because of how it 
reconciles the state’s interest in reducing the potential for or 
appearance of judicial bias with the free speech rights of judicial 
candidates.  In recognizing a rather broad right of judicial 
candidates to speak during an election free of the strictures of 
ethical canons,105 the Court established certain principles regarding 
the nature of judicial bias and the reconciliation of judicial elections 
with judicial independence.  These principles may help us to read 
Caperton. 
At issue in White was Minnesota’s Code of Judicial Conduct’s 
“announce clause,” which forbade judicial candidates from 
announcing their position on disputed legal or political issues.106  
The Court found that the clause was an unconstitutional burden on 
speech, impeding the ability of elected public officials to express 
themselves on matters of public importance.107  The restriction could 
not, in the Court’s view, be justified by the state’s interest in 
 102. Compare Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2256 
(2009) (listing the members of the dissent as Justices Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, 
and Alito), with Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886 (listing the members of the 
majority as including Justice Kennedy and the Caperton dissenters), Davis, 128 
S. Ct. at 2765 (same), Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S at 454 (same), and White, 
536 U.S. at 766 (listing the members of the majority as including Justices 
Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas). 
 103. Hoersting & Smith, supra note 52, at 320. Attorney Hoersting and 
Professor Smith were struck by Justice Kennedy’s repeated references to what 
were expenditures as contributions.  Id. at 344–45. 
 104. 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
 105. Id. at 788. 
 106. Id. at 768. 
 107. Id. at 781–82, 788. 
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assuring the fact or appearance of judicial impartiality.108  In 
assessing that interest, Justice Scalia, writing for a five-justice 
majority, identified three senses in which a judge may be impartial.  
His taxonomy is useful for the discussion that follows. 
First, impartiality might require that a judge ought to be 
impartial as between specific parties, i.e., each litigant should 
expect that a judge will apply the law to him in the same way as she 
applies it to every other party.109  This was the sense of impartiality 
claimed to be lacking in Caperton and the line of cases on which it 
relied. 
Second, impartiality may require that a judge lack any 
preconception on a particular legal issue.110  Accordingly, a judge 
who, prior to any proceeding before her, believes that a state 
constitutional mandate of equal protection requires legal recognition 
of same-sex marriage is not impartial.  For the White majority, that 
interest cannot justify restrictions on speech.  In fact, it is not a 
legitimate interest at all.  According to Justice Scalia, “A judge’s 
lack of predisposition regarding the relevant legal issues in a case 
has never been thought a necessary component of equal justice[;] it 
is virtually impossible to find a judge who does not have 
preconceptions about the law.”111  In fact, that a judge’s mind would 
be a tabula rasa on significant legal issues, “would be evidence of 
lack of qualification, not lack of bias.”112  In Justice Scalia’s view, the 
state’s interest in that form of impartiality can never constitute a 
compelling interest. 
Finally, impartiality may require open-mindedness, i.e., a 
willingness “to consider views that oppose his preconceptions, and 
remain open to persuasion, when the issues arise in a pending 
case,”113 not the lack of any preconception about an issue.  “This sort 
of impartiality,” according to Justice Scalia, “seeks to guarantee 
each litigant, not an equal chance to win the legal points in the case, 
but at least some chance of doing so.”114  The White Court assumed, 
but did not decide, that the state may have a compelling interest in 
ensuring impartiality in this third sense.115  It concluded, however, 
that the “announce clause” was not narrowly tailored to ensure the 
fact or appearance of impartiality in this sense.116  In the view of the 
majority, statements made by a judicial candidate outside of the 
context of a judicial election or while holding judicial office are just 
 108. Id. at 777. 
 109. Id. at 775–76. 
 110. Id. at 777. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 778 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 836 (1972)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See id. 
 116. Id. at 780. 
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as likely to create (or not to create) a public perception of close-
mindedness.117  Noting that “campaign promises are—by long 
democratic tradition—the least binding form of human 
commitment,” Justice Scalia expressed skepticism that 
nonpromissory statements could ever form the basis for concern 
regarding a judge’s impartiality and that, in any event, “‘[d]ebate on 
the qualifications of candidates’ is ‘at the core of our electoral 
process and of the First Amendment freedoms,’ not at the edges.”118
For the dissent, the unique nature of the judicial role makes the 
particular views of a judicial candidate less important.  Because 
judges “do not sit as representatives of particular persons, 
communities, or parties” and “serve no faction or constituency,” “‘[i]t 
is the business of judges to be indifferent to popularity.’”119  Because 
of this, according to Justice Ginsburg, “the public’s ability to choose 
agents who will act at its behest” is not only unnecessary in judicial 
races, it is, in some sense, antithetical to the judicial role.120  She 
echoed the “legal” model of the judicial role: 
Unlike their counterparts in the political branches, judges are 
expected to refrain from catering to particular constituencies 
or committing themselves on controversial issues in advance of 
adversarial presentation.  Their mission is to decide 
“individual cases and controversies” on individual records, 
neutrally applying legal principles, and, when necessary, 
“stand[ing] up to what is generally supreme in a democracy: 
the popular will.”121
Justice Ginsburg expressly rejected Justice Scalia’s taxonomy of 
bias, arguing that considerations of judicial bias “do not focus solely 
on bias against a particular party, but rather inquire more broadly 
into whether the surrounding circumstances and incentives 
compromise the judge’s ability faithfully to discharge her assigned 
duties.”122  She offered a broad reading of the Court’s earlier cases on 
judicial bias that would later inform the opinions of both the 
majority and dissent in Caperton: 
These cases establish three propositions important to this 
dispute.  First, a litigant is deprived of due process where the 
judge who hears his case has a “direct, personal, substantial, 
and pecuniary” interest in ruling against him.  Second, this 
interest need not be as direct as it was in Tumey, where the 
 117. See id. at 778–81. 
 118. Id. at 780–81 (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 
U.S. 214, 222–23 (1989)). 
 119. Id. at 806 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Chisom v. Roemer, 501 
U.S. 380, 401 n.29 (1991)). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 803–804 (citations omitted). 
 122. Id. at 815 n.3. 
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judge was essentially compensated for each conviction he 
obtained; the interest may stem, as in Ward, from the judge’s 
knowledge that his success and tenure in office depend on 
certain outcomes.  “[T]he test,” we have said, “is whether 
the . . . situation is one ‘which would offer a possible 
temptation to the average man as a judge [that] might lead 
him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.’”  And third, 
due process does not require a showing that the judge is 
actually biased as a result of his self-interest.  Rather, our 
cases have “always endeavored to prevent even the probability 
of unfairness.”  “[T]he requirement of due process of law in 
judicial procedure is not satisfied by the argument that men of 
the highest honor and the greatest self-sacrifice could carry it 
on without danger of injustice.”123
For Justice Ginsburg, “When [an elected] judicial candidate 
promises to rule a certain way on an issue that may later reach the 
courts, . . . she will be under pressure to resist the pleas of litigants 
who advance positions contrary to her pledges on the campaign 
trail.”124  This, she continued, would result in the judge having a 
“‘direct, personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary interest’ in ruling 
against certain litigants, for she may be voted off the bench and 
thereby lose her salary and emoluments unless she honors the 
pledge that secured her election.”125  A prohibition against the mere 
“announcement” of a judge’s political or legal views is necessary to 
avoid circumvention on the restriction on pledges or promises.126
2. White and the Judicial Role 
White certainly reflects a strong view of the constitutional free 
speech imperative.  The case has been criticized as an expression of 
First Amendment “formalism” that fails to take into account the 
unique nature of the judicial role.127  Those Justices composing the 
majority in White have generally been suspicious of government 
 123. Id. at 815 (citations omitted). 
 124. Id. at 816. 
 125. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)). 
 126. See id. at 819–21. 
 127. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation, Comparative 
Constitutionalism, and Fiss-ian Freedoms, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 265, 317–19 
(2003) (arguing that the White Court’s “attachment to existing constitutional 
categories ‘election’ and ‘speech’” led to an “all or nothing” approach that 
privileged the First Amendment above compelling state interests); Gregory P. 
Magarian, The Pragmatic Populism of Justice Stevens’s Free Speech 
Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2201, 2208 & n.41 (2006) (contrasting 
Justice Stevens’s “focus on the consequences of free speech decisions” with 
“formal adherence to some libertarian abstraction” evident in decisions such as 
White); Richard H. Pildes, Formalism and Functionalism in the Constitutional 
Law of Politics, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1525, 1528–32 (2003) (asserting in discussion 
of White and related cases that “the law of democracy remains one of the last 
bastions of legal formalism in constitutional law”). 
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attempts to manage political discourse.128  But White also reflects a 
particular view of the judicial role as well. 
What is that view?  White might be read as a repudiation of the 
“traditionalist” or “formalist” models of judicial decision making.129  
On this view, judges do not rely on personal preferences or 
philosophies but apply rules of law that can be, for the most part, 
discerned and applied without relying on individual policy 
preference and world views.130  In dissent, Justice Stevens echoed 
this model, writing that while judges may personally hold particular 
issue stances, they put these aside in deciding cases.131  To the 
extent this is true, information about those views is irrelevant and a 
candidate’s claim or implication that they may be considered in 
deciding cases is “illegitimate.”132  It is not only unnecessary to the 
process of judicial selection but potentially harmful in that it may 
lead the public to demand—and judges to provide—decisions that 
owe more to what the public wants than what the law requires.133
Other models for judicial behavior emphasize the degree to 
which considerations other than “the facts and law” influence 
 128. Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas have generally voted to limit 
restrictions of campaign expenditures and speech, often joined by former Chief 
Justice Rehnquist.  See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 894 (2010); 
see also Richard Briffault, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC: The 
Beginning of the End of the Buckley Era?, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1729, 1757–59 
(2001). 
 129. See, e.g., Anca Cornis-Pop, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and 
the Announce Clause in Light of Theories of Judge and Voter Decisionmaking: 
With Strategic Judges and Rational Voters, the Supreme Court Was Right To 
Strike Down the Clause, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 123, 124–25 (2004); Michael R. 
Diminio, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Robe: Judicial Elections, the 
First Amendment, and Judges as Politicians, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 301, 339–
42 (2003). 
 130. See, e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 973, 981 (2001) (asserting that judges should decide based on “the 
evidence and the law, not on public opinion polls, personal whim, prejudice or 
fear, or interference from the legislative or the executive branches or private 
citizens or groups”); Cornis-Pop, supra note 129, at 154 (“[T]he legal model 
holds that judges routinely can and do set aside all personal and external biases 
in exercising their discretion and deciding cases based on the facts and law 
before them.”); Bruce Fein & Burt Neuborne, Why Should We Care About 
Independent and Accountable Judges?, 84 JUDICATURE 58, 59 (2000) (asserting 
that judges should have a “culture and cast of mind that approaches the 
interpretive task as guided by principles that rise above personal or partisan 
likes or dislikes”). 
 131. See White, 536 U.S. at 798 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 132. Daniel Burke, Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7B(1)(c): Toward the 
Proper Regulation of Speech in Judicial Campaigns, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
181, 183 (1993). 
 133. See Pozen, supra note 62, at 273 (“[Under a formalist view of the 
judicial process,] elections would not offer voters any meaningful choices, and 
an appointive scheme would seem preferable as a way to economize on selection 
costs and to ensure that candidates have the necessary technical 
qualifications.”). 
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judicial decision making.  The classic attitudinal model, for example, 
argues that judicial decision making is primarily—or at least 
substantially—affected by a judge’s personal values and policy 
preferences.134  If “judges are motivated by their personal policy 
preferences, the announce clause precludes discussion of issues that 
are relevant to voters’ candidate choices.”135
White certainly recognized the public’s interest in seeking—and 
a candidate’s right to provide—information about a candidate’s 
political or legal viewpoints and the ways in which those viewpoints 
may impact adjudication.  It accepts the idea that the voters may 
hold judges accountable for adjudicatory outcomes.  If that 
recognition was, in fact, rooted in a view that judges have wide 
latitude to incorporate their personal views into decision making, 
there would be a certain irony in play.  The dissenters in White—
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer—have arguably seen 
“legal” constraints on judicial decision making as less extensive and 
the role of considerations of policy and “extralegal” values as more 
important to the process of judging.136  Justice Scalia, of course, is 
more likely to see the judicial process as the lawyerly business of 
discerning the meaning of a text and applying it in accordance with 
that meaning and less likely to resort to considerations of policy and 
other matters outside the text.137
The argument over White’s consistency with the judicial role 
mirrors a similar argument over judicial elections in general.  David 
Pozen recently argued that: 
. . . elective judiciaries can be seen as the real-world 
compatriots of the critical legal studies (CLS) and law and 
economics movements, in that each sees judicial 
decisionmaking in instrumental terms.  As with the CLS-style 
judge pursuing elite domination or the economic-minded judge 
pursuing efficiency, the elected judge with an eye on the polls 
is pursuing something other than the best legal answer.  Or, 
rather, her vision of the best legal answer may be conditioned 
on something—public opinion—that cannot be found in any 
accepted legal or moral source.138
If White is seen as a case about the validation of an 
 134. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 65 (1993). 
 135. Cornis-Pop, supra note 129, at 126. 
 136. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 399 n.27 (1991) (Stevens, J.) 
(“A judge brings to his or her job of interpreting texts ‘a well-considered 
judgment of what is best for the community.’  As the concurrence notes, Justice 
Holmes and Justice Cardozo each wrote eloquently about the ‘policymaking 
nature of the judicial function.’” (citation omitted)). 
 137. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW (1997) (describing Justice Scalia’s interpretive 
philosophy). 
 138. Pozen, supra note 62, at 290. 
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instrumental view of the judicial role, this would have rather jarring 
implications.  I would have sooner expected to see the “wolf . . . dwell 
with the lamb”139 than Antonin Scalia sharing the jurisprudential 
insights of Roberto Unger. 
But, as most commentators recognize, real-world views of the 
judicial role cannot be reduced to caricatures of judicial activism 
(“judges do what they want”) and judicial restraint (“judges are 
technicians”).  Few believe that the judicial process is that simple.140  
White does recognize that judges differ in the way in which they 
apply the law in ways that have nothing to do with experience and 
qualifications, but that is a commonplace observation that cannot 
explain the difference between the majority and the dissent and is of 
limited value in discerning what the case might tell us about 
resolving the tension between the impartiality that is claimed to be 
rooted in judicial independence and the type of accountability sought 
by the election of judges. 
To the contrary, most lawyers and judges subscribe to some 
form of the “strategic” model of judicial decision making.141  That 
model recognizes that while judges are influenced by their policy 
preferences and may even wish to decide cases in accordance with 
them, there are institutional values and external constraints that 
restrain their ability to do so, such as legal texts, norms of opinion 
writing, precedent, constraints imposed by other branches of 
government, the institutional interests of the judiciary, and 
internalization of notions of judicial restraint and public opinion.142
Within this broad recognition of judicial limitations and license, 
there are certain tensions.  There is what has been referred to as the 
“countermajoritarian difficulty,” the tension between judicial review 
and the legitimacy conferred by the consent of the governed to a 
particular law or public policy.  In other words, “[T]he moral and 
political problem posed by the power of courts to invalidate 
legislation supported by democratic majorities (or at least legislative 
ones).”143  To the extent that judges decide cases based on their own 
notions of what constitutes good or bad law or policy, their 
interference with the political branches raises questions of 
legitimacy. 
 139. Isaiah 11:6 (King James) (“The wolf also shall dwell with the lamb, and 
the leopard shall lie down with the kid; and the calf and the young lion and the 
fatling together; and a little child shall lead them.”). 
 140. See Cornis-Pop, supra note 129, at 154; Pozen, supra note 62, at 273–
74. 
 141. See Cornis-Pop, supra note 129, at 163–65 (describing the “strategic” 
model of judicial decision making). 
 142. Id. at 163–64. 
 143. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not 
Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2364 (2006); accord ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE 
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–23 
(2d ed. 1986) (discussing the “counter-majoritarian difficulty”). 
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But there is also the “majoritarian difficulty,” i.e., recognition of 
the ways in which the fear of, or a commitment to respect, public 
opinion might compromise judicial independence.144  No one believes 
that judges should simply provide the public what it wants.145  The 
application of even clear and democratically adopted legal 
standards—for example, to exclude an improperly obtained 
confession or to dismiss the claims of an injured plaintiff—may be 
unpopular.  The public may be unable to appreciate the ways in 
which the rule of law may lead to unpopular results.  Public 
pressures may cause judicial candidates to commit to certain 
positions that interfere with disinterested discernment and 
application of the law. 
If, as David Pozen writes, “the countermajoritarian difficulty 
asks ‘how unelected/unaccountable judges can be justified in a 
regime committed to democracy,’ the majoritarian difficulty asks 
‘how elected/accountable judges can be justified in a regime 
committed to constitutionalism.’”146  White says something about the 
second question based on insights derived from the first.  If judges 
exercise discretion that is influenced by their personal values, policy 
preferences, and preconceptions regarding legal questions, then 
considerations of legitimacy require that these matters be known 
and considered by those who select them.  If judicial selection is 
committed to voters, then the accountability to public opinion 
cannot, without more, deprive a litigant of due process. 
This tension is mirrored in calls for, on the one hand, judicial 
independence and, on the other, judicial accountability—concepts 
that are themselves in tension.147
i.  Deemphasis of the Majoritarian Difficulty: Accountability 
Matters.  It is almost obligatory in articles about judicial election 
and recusal to recite former California Supreme Court Justice Otto 
 144. Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and 
the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 694 (1995). 
 145. See N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 212 
(2008) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (observing that it is sometimes “difficult to 
reconcile” elections with the desire for “a functioning judiciary respected for its 
independence, its professional attainments and the absolute probity of its 
judges”); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 400 (1991) (noting that judges must 
sometimes defy the popular will); id. at 411 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining 
that a judge’s duty to represent the law often requires her “to rule against the 
People”). 
 146. Pozen, supra note 62, at 279. 
 147. See Judge Diane S. Sykes, Independence v. Accountability: Finding a 
Balance Amidst the Changing Politics of State-Court Judicial Selection, 
Address Before the Eastern District of Wisconsin Bar Association (Apr. 17, 
2008), in 92 MARQ. L. REV. 341, 349 (2008) (“Elections operate as an external 
constraint on state judges’ job performance.  There is no question that this 
weakens judicial independence—that’s the whole point.  Independence and 
accountability are important, but conflicting, values.”). 
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Kaus’s evolving zoological similes regarding the impact of judicial 
elections on controversial cases.  At one time, he likened the matter 
to “finding a crocodile in your bathtub when you go to shave in the 
morning . . . .  You know it’s there, and you try not to think about it, 
but it’s hard to think about much else while you’re shaving.”148  
Later, perhaps seeking a less gendered approach, he said: “[w]hen 
you’re eating dinner with a gorilla, it’s hard to make small talk, even 
when he’s using the right knife and fork.”149
An emphasis on the majoritarian difficulty may well lead to 
calls, if not for the abolition of judicial elections,150 for a certain type 
of election in which appeals to public opinion and discussion of 
adjudicatory outcomes and legal or political issues are severely 
limited.151  Debate in these elections would tend to be platitudinous, 
largely concerned with qualifications, experience, and the recitation 
of uncontroversial (and uninformative) profundities.  They would be, 
as once observed, “about as exciting as a game of checkers.  Played 
by mail.”152  They would be the sleepy old judicial elections that 
some have come to love and would love to preserve. 
More than one commentator has suggested that judicial silence 
on controverted matters is necessary to bolster public confidence in 
the judiciary and acceptance of judicial decisions.153  Even if the 
cognoscenti are aware that judging cannot be reduced to an entirely 
dispassionate discernment of “the law,” it is best if the public 
believes this to be so, i.e., there is a state interest in encouraging 
what my old torts professor, Duncan Kennedy, referred to as “lay 
formalism.”  Others have expressed a lack of confidence in the 
capacity of voters to assess the qualifications of judicial candidates.  
For some, electing judges is the equivalent of electing nuclear 
 148. Maura Dolan, Court Is Feeling the Heat on Prop. 8: Justices Risk Recall 
If They Vote To Overturn the State’s Ban on Same-Sex Marriage, L.A. TIMES, 
Nov. 19, 2008, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 149. Philip Hager, Kaus Urges Reelection of Embattled Court Justices, L.A. 
TIMES, Sept. 28, 1986, at A3. 
 150. Justice Ginsburg and former Justice O’Connor have done just that.  See 
generally Robert Barnes, Ginsburg Would Forbid Judicial Elections, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 12, 2010, at A2; John Schwartz, Effort Begun To Abolish the Election 
of Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2009, at A12. 
 151. Pozen refers to accommodationists who seek to limit the salience of 
judicial elections and the exchange of information, not because they support 
judicial elections, but because they wish to limit them “as a second-best strategy 
in a world in which judicial elections are not likely to go away anytime soon.”  
Pozen, supra note 62, at 309.  It is not that they think that limiting competition, 
speech, participation, and turnout are good things, but they seek not to make 
judicial elections “as good as possible,” but rather, “as inoffensive as possible.”  
Id.  It is a “fundamentally defensive creed.”  Id. at 312. 
 152. William C. Bayne, Lynchard’s Candidacy, Ads Putting Spice into 
Justice Race: Hernando Attorney Challenging Cobb, COMM. APPEAL (Memphis), 
Oct. 29, 2000, at DS1. 
 153. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 798 (2002) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Burke, supra note 132, at 182–83. 
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physicists.154  
As noted above, few lawyers—and no member of the Court—
would deny the need for judges to resist public pressure—at least 
when the law requires a ruling that is unpopular.  Support for an 
appointive judiciary or nostalgia for the old, sleepy judicial election 
is often justified by a desire to insulate judges from public pressure.  
One might expect that those who believe that there is likely a clear 
legal answer would value judicial independence more than those 
who see the law as “underdetermined” and leaving relatively greater 
room for the exercise of judicial discretion and judicial policy 
making.  Emphasis on judicial independence (in response to the 
majoritarian difficulty) is often supported by a view of judicial 
discretion that is cabined by the internal constraints of what Justice 
Scalia calls “lawyer’s business.”155  Hamilton thought that the 
independence conferred on judges appointed for life would protect 
“the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of 
those ill humors, which the arts of designing men, or the influence of 
particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people 
themselves.”156  He saw it as the “best expedient which can be 
devised in any government, to secure a steady, upright, and 
impartial administration of the laws.”157  But he also saw a judiciary 
“bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define 
and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before 
them.”158
But perhaps Hamilton’s associationism of judicial 
traditionalism with a high degree of institutional independence is 
not quite right.  It may well be that those who hold to the 
“traditionalist” view of the judiciary or to a form of the strategic 
model of voting that views the institutional and normative 
constraints on judicial decision making as relatively strong are less 
concerned with the need to shield judges from public opinion by 
 154. See Pozen, supra note 62, at 293 n.124 (“Most of what courts do is 
opaque to people who are not lawyers.  It is completely unrealistic to think that 
the average voter will ever know enough about judicial performance to be able 
to evaluate judicial candidates intelligently.  That is a decisive objection 
to . . . elect[ing] judges.” (quoting Richard A. Posner, Judicial Autonomy in a 
Political Environment, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 5 (2006) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  But see Abrahamson, supra note 130, at 995 (“Underlying the debate 
about appointed versus elected judges is a fundamental disagreement about the 
capacity of the voters to choose wisely.  If the people need more information, it 
is our task to provide it.”). 
 155. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2274 (2009) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). 
 156. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961). 
 157.  Id. at 465. 
 158.  Id. at 471; accord Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 607–08 (2005) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that a view of the Constitution as “evolving” 
makes a “mockery” of Hamilton’s expectations). 
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rendering judicial elections less salient and substantive. 
If judges are significantly constrained by legal texts and 
maxims of opinion writing, then the ability of the public to exert 
“improper” influence on the judicial process is limited.159  If judges 
internalize—and the public demands—a more modest view of the 
judicial role, the potential for intolerable compromise of judicial 
independence is less likely.  These constraints—as well as public 
expectations—temper judicial populism and relieve the majoritarian 
difficulty.160  Of course, it could be argued that the campaign 
discussion of issues and cases expands, rather than limits, the scope 
of discretion.  But there is certainly empirical evidence that calls 
into question the notion that federal judges are the 
countermajoritarian heroes that some may want them to be.161
In contrast, the threat to judicial independence from judicial 
elections and robust campaign speech may be more intractable to 
those with a more expansive view of the judicial role.  These jurists 
may emphasize the countermajoritarian nature of the judiciary not 
so much as a “difficulty,” but as a virtue.  On this view, the exercise 
of judicial discretion within that range of choices free from the type 
of constraints recognized by the strategic model ought to be 
exercised, insofar as is possible, free of public opinion.  Judges are to 
act as a restraint on democratic excess not only by holding a 
democracy to the decisions it has made but also by protecting it from 
improvident decisions or by making certain “essential” decisions 
when the political processes have “failed” to so do so.  Indeed, it may 
well be that those jurists who believe that judges have more room 
for the interpretation of “undetermined texts” and for the 
importation of policy considerations into decision making are those 
less favorably disposed to public influence on the process.  In fact, 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in White emphasizes not so much the 
freedom to discern and apply something like “a brooding 
omnipresence in the sky,”162 but the need for a judge to act—to 
“discern” or “choose” whatever standard or methodology will inform 
 159.  Professor Croley argued that the views of those who subscribe to a 
rather narrow concept of judicial review, requiring a relatively clear 
constitutional proscription before invalidating legislation, might be perfectly 
consistent with elective judiciaries.  See Croley, supra note 144, at 753–60.  
Pozen argues, as noted in the text here, that this may not be so if majoritarian 
sentiment causes judges to ignore clear legal commands.  See Pozen, supra note 
62, at 280 n.65. 
 160.  See Sykes, supra note 147, at 349 (“[T]he internal constraints on judges 
operate to prevent [accountability to the electorate] from becoming too great a 
sacrifice.  Most of the time, judges who do not stray too far too fast from the 
judicial mainstream are reelected, often without opposition.”). 
 161. See Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 
Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 4–6 (1996) (acknowledging scholarly works that 
question the countermajoritarian notion of the role of the judiciary); see, e.g., 
Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993). 
 162. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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her decision making—independently of public opinion.163  To 
require—or even to permit—judges to offer their views for public 
approbation is to undermine this stronger form of judicial 
independence.164
White puts paid to the latter view as a justification for the 
restriction of speech.  The Court rejects the idea that the state may 
protect the countermajoritarian nature of the judicial function by 
restricting discussion of legal and political issues that may affect 
judicial decision making.  In Justice Scalia’s view: 
[The] complete separation of the judiciary from the enterprise 
of “representative government” might have some truth in 
those countries where judges neither make law themselves nor 
set aside the laws enacted by the legislature.  It is not a true 
picture of the American system.  Not only do state-court judges 
possess the power to “make” common law, but they have the 
immense power to shape the States’ constitutions as well.165
This, he continues, is why judicial elections became popular and 
the state may not, in the interest of protecting judges from public 
opinion, “prohibit candidates from communicating relevant 
information to voters during an election.”166
In states that have opted for judicial elections, there can be no 
effort on the part of the state to restrict the flow of information on 
the grounds that it will render candidates more “responsive” to the 
public or because voters will misapprehend candidate messages and 
choose poorly.  Thus, Justice Kennedy, concurring in White, writes 
that: 
Minnesota may choose to have an elected judiciary.  It may 
strive to define those characteristics that exemplify judicial 
excellence.  It may enshrine its definitions in a code of judicial 
conduct.  It may adopt recusal standards more rigorous than 
due process requires, and censure judges who violate these 
standards.  What Minnesota may not do, however, is censor 
what the people hear as they undertake to decide for 
themselves which candidate is most likely to be an exemplary 
judicial officer.  Deciding the relevance of candidate speech is 
the right of the voters, not the State.167
White recognizes that if judicial elections are to be permitted, 
 163. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 806 (2002) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that judges must “be indifferent to 
popularity” and “do what is legally right” even if it is not what “the home crowd” 
wants, and that the outcome of cases “cannot depend on the will of the public” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 164. Pozen, supra note 62, at 327. 
 165. White, 536 U.S. at 784 (majority opinion). 
 166. Id. at 782. 
 167. Id. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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then judicial independence cannot mean that judges be freed from 
being held accountable by an electorate that may disapprove of 
certain adjudicatory outcomes.  The restriction of campaign speech 
is only one way in which popular opinion might affect judicial 
decision making in an elective system.168  In fact, the White Court 
observed that “campaign promises are—by long democratic 
tradition—the least binding form of human commitment.”169  A 
number of studies show that judicial candidates may conform their 
decisions to the perceived preferences of the electorate (or other 
retention agents) or its preference for “tough-on-crime” judging.170  
This is unrelated to whether a judge has said a word on the subject, 
and in fact, at least one study finds that judges align their decision 
making most closely when an election is imminent, irrespective of 
personal policy preferences.171  It seems unlikely, then, that 
prohibiting a candidate from stating his position could ever resolve 
the majoritarian difficulty in the sense of eliminating or even 
reducing popular pressure.172
Thus, the White majority flatly rejected Justice Ginsburg’s view 
that a judge who fears a decision might cause him to lose support is 
the equivalent of a “direct, personal, substantial[, and] pecuniary 
interest” in ruling against certain litigants:173
[I]f, as Justice Ginsburg claims, it violates due process for a 
judge to sit in a case in which ruling one way rather than 
another increases his prospects for reelection, then—quite 
simply—the practice of electing judges is itself a violation of 
due process. . . . [These views] are not, however, the views 
reflected in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which has coexisted with the election of judges 
 168. See id. at 782 (majority opinion) (“Surely the judge who frees Timothy 
McVeigh places his job much more at risk than the judge who (horror of 
horrors!) reconsiders his previously announced view on a disputed legal issue.”). 
 169.  Id. at 780.  Professor Michelle Friedland observes that at least one 
contract law casebook and two leading contract law treatises use a case 
involving a broken campaign promise as an example of the “intention not to be 
bound” doctrine.  Michelle T. Friedland, Disqualification or Suppression: Due 
Process and the Response to Judicial Campaign Speech, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 563, 
602 (2004). 
 170. See supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text. 
 171. See Friedland, supra note 169, at 621–24. 
 172. Erwin Chemerinsky argues that a “judge who is trying, consciously or 
unconsciously, to please the voters will take the politically popular approach, 
whether or not it was expressed previously.”  Erwin Chemerinsky, Restrictions 
on the Speech of Judicial Candidates Are Unconstitutional, 35 IND. L. REV. 735, 
744 (2002).  If the position becomes unpopular, he is likely to abandon it.  Id. at 
744–45.  “Either way,” Chemerinsky concludes, “the earlier speech itself makes 
little difference in the judge’s behavior.”  Id. at 745. 
 173. White, 536 U.S. at 814 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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ever since it was adopted . . . .174
In fact, those who believe that judicial discretion is more 
constrained may well see the emphasis on judicial independence—
advocated by those with a more expansive view of the judicial role—
as an attempt to mask judicial policy making behind a façade of 
formalism.  This suggests another lesson to be derived from White. 
ii.  Emphasis of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: Differing 
Perspectives Matter.  Although the countermajoritarian difficulty is 
typically associated with appointed judiciaries, it might also be 
relevant to elections if voters are denied what may be the most 
relevant information about competing candidates.  White says that 
this information is relevant and, in doing so, reflects changes in the 
federal confirmation process.  Lawyers have always understood that 
while, for example, Antonin Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsburg are 
both brilliant lawyers, they differ dramatically in their approach to 
the law.175  Acknowledging and evaluating those differences is an 
important part of the selection process.  Just as the federal 
confirmation process has become more concerned with a nominee’s 
substantive views,176 voters have a right to know something about a 
candidate’s legal philosophy and policy preferences.  If the legal 
preconceptions and policy preferences of judges are important to 
decision making, then they are equally as important to the judicial-
selection process.  If a state has chosen to elect its judges, then 
accountability and popular sovereignty require that voters have the 
ability to assess all pertinent information about a candidate without 
state interference. 
Indeed, some commentators argue that judicial elections relieve 
the countermajoritarian difficulty.177  Elections, it is argued, impart 
 174. Id. at 782–83 (majority opinion). 
 175. See Phil Brennan, Justice Scalia: Ruth Ginsburg Is My Best Friend, 
NEWSMAX.COM (May 16, 2008), http://www.newsmax.com/InsideCover/scalia 
-ginsberg/2008/05/16/id/323695 (noting Justice Scalia statement that Justice 
Ginsberg’s “basic approach is not mine”). 
 176. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Kagan’s View of the Court Confirmation Process, 
Before She Was a Part of It, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2010, at A16 (recounting 
Justice Kagan’s view that “many of the votes a Supreme Court justice casts 
have little to do with technical legal ability and much to do with conceptions of 
value” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Awkward: Kagan’s Confirmation 
Hearings Criticism, CBSNEWS.COM (June 3, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com 
/stories/2010/06/03/politics/main6544287.shtml (noting that then-U.S. Supreme 
Court nominee Elena Kagan may be questioned more substantively during her 
Senate Judiciary Committee hearing). 
 177. Pozen, supra note 62, at 324–25 (citing MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE 
CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 168 n.17 (1982); Judith Resnik, 
Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s 
Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1629 (2006); and Jonathan Zasloff, 
Taking Politics Seriously: A Theory of California’s Separation of Powers, 51 
UCLA L. REV. 1079, 1083 n.10 (2004)). 
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democratic legitimacy on the judicial branch and provide for greater 
public accountability.178  If that is so—and it is certainly an objective 
of states that have decided to elect judges—then making those 
elections meaningful by allowing the public to demand and 
candidates to provide information that may be pertinent to the 
adjudication of cases may further that purpose.  Some have even 
argued that judicial elections free state courts to intervene in the 
political process in “progressive” ways,179 while others suggest that 
elected judges are less likely to offend the majority’s wishes and that 
it may be better “for progressives to turn their back on elective 
judiciaries, in aspiration if not in advocacy.”180
However that may be, White rejects the idea that the state can 
pick and choose what information voters can be trusted with or 
superintend the way in which it is presented.  The decision makes 
clear that these interests do not justify prohibiting the discussion of 
legal and political issues—even those issues that may later come 
before the candidate once elected.181  It reflects a rather strong 
skepticism that the state may dictate “how” these issues are to be 
discussed.  If the voters cannot be trusted to evaluate judicial 
 178. See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The 
Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1157–61 (1999). 
 179. See Pozen, supra note 62, at 325–26 (recounting scholarly work that 
argues that an elected judiciary has the people’s endorsement to take 
progressive interpretive views). 
 180. Id. at 327.  This is not clear.  Whether “progressive” policies favor, as 
Pozen puts it, “traditionally disadvantaged or despised groups,” see id., they are 
likely to be advanced by elective judiciaries’ economic populism and may well be 
served by elective judiciaries.  While “tough-on-crime” ads are one form of 
appeal to majority sentiment, ads attacking a judge’s supposed affinity for 
insurance companies or manufacturers are another.  In fact, some studies show 
that state courts are just as likely to uphold claims of federal rights.  See, e.g., 
Brett Christopher Gerry, Parity Revisited: An Empirical Comparison of State 
and Lower Federal Court Interpretations of Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 233 (1999); Michael E. Solomine & 
James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An 
Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213 (1983).  
Others have noted that claims related to gay rights have also done well in state 
courts.  See generally, e.g., William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority, 16 
CONST. COMMENT. 599 (1999).  Although a majority of the state supreme courts 
that have found a state constitutional right to same-sex marriage or civil unions 
are appointive, some are elective.  See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 
(Cal. 2008) (appointive); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) 
(elective).  A recent study by Professors Joshua Hall and Russell Sobel 
concludes that judiciaries in states with merit election systems tend to perform 
better on the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s ranking of state legal systems.  See 
generally JOSHUA C. HALL & RUSSELL S. SOBEL, SHOW-ME INST., IS THE ‘MISSOURI 
PLAN’ GOOD FOR MISSOURI?  THE ECONOMICS OF JUDICIAL SELECTION (2008), 
available at http://www.showmeinstitute.org/docLib/20080515_smi_study_15 
.pdf. 
 181. Cf. Chemerinsky, supra note 172, at 745 (“I cannot imagine a credible 
argument that it violates due process for Justice Scalia to sit on abortion cases, 
though it is absolutely clear as to how he will vote.”). 
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candidates, then judges ought not be elected.  Judicial candidates 
have opinions on these matters.  The opinions matter.  Voters are 
entitled to ask and candidates have a right to tell. 
iii.  Judicial Elections Are Different: Independence Still Matters.  
The White majority, nevertheless, recognized that there is a certain 
tension between the election of judges and judicial independence.  
The Court acknowledged that a state has a compelling interest in 
preventing favoritism for or against particular parties.182  It also 
assumed that a state might have a compelling interest in ensuring 
at least a certain type of judicial open-mindedness.183
That interest cannot be preserved by requiring judges to 
pretend (in public) that they approach each matter with a mind 
wiped clean—a tabula rasa free of any preconceptions.  
Nevertheless, unlike legislators and executives, there is a sense in 
which we believe that a judge ought to be open to argument and 
willing to change her mind.  Categorical commitments by a 
candidate for governor (“I will never raise taxes”) are acceptable, but 
the same type of promise by a candidate for judgeship (“Read my 
lips!  No more affirmative action!”) might be different. 
Additionally, there may be a sense in which judges are bound to 
impartiality toward classes of litigants in a way that legislators and 
executives are not.  We may not believe it admirable that a 
legislator might promise to “fleece the rich” or to “go after big out-of-
state companies.”  But these statements do not, in and of 
themselves, raise constitutional concerns.  We would not think that 
they prohibit the legislator from acting on proposals for progressive 
taxation or more legislation expanding the liability of 
manufacturers. 
Finally, although there is a band of judicial discretion and the 
law is often undetermined, there are times when it is quite clear.  
White’s recognition of the right of a judge to state views that are 
relevant in determining how she will exercise her discretion may not 
apply—or at least not in the same way—to a judicial candidate’s 
stated intent not to follow the law (“I will never follow Roe v. Wade”). 
3. The Application of White 
Post-White decisions in the lower courts seem generally 
consistent with these observations.  They suggest a robust 
protection against rules that seek to silence a candidate’s statement 
of his legal views, whether a blanket prohibition against announcing 
those views or an application of rules prohibiting pledges, promises, 
or commitments in a way that effectively prevents a candidate from 
addressing issues of likely interest to the voters.184  However, even 
 182. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775–77 (2002). 
 183. Id. at 778–81. 
 184. See, e.g., Duwe v. Alexander, 490 F. Supp. 2d 968 (W.D. Wis. 2007) 
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after White, it may be permissible to prohibit candidates from 
promising to decide a particular case in a particular way (something 
that would presumably foreclose his willingness to be persuaded to 
change those views or would mean that he has committed to some 
predetermined view of the facts as opposed to the law).  Consistent 
with Justice Scalia’s recognition of a compelling interest in 
preventing bias in White’s first sense, it may also be permissible to 
adopt rules or practices that protect against bias toward particular 
litigants or classes of litigants. 
Some courts have extended White’s invalidation of “announce 
clauses” to a variety of canons designed to prevent candidates from 
“committing or appearing to commit”—or even from “pledging or 
promising” to adhere to—a particular position.185  Others have 
upheld facial challenges to these clauses, but only after narrowing 
constructions that make clear that these restrictions do not apply to 
a mere statement of a legal or political position.186  In Duwe v. 
Alexander,187 for example, a district court rejected a facial challenge 
to Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule 60.06(3)(b), which provided that a 
judge or judicial candidate shall not make, “with respect to cases, 
controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the court, 
pledges, promises, or commitments that are inconsistent with the 
impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of the office.”188  
The court noted that the rule “require[d] an actual commitment to 
rule a certain way on a case, controversy or issue likely to come 
before the court.”189  The court concluded that the state does have a 
compelling interest in assuring impartiality in the third sense 
addressed by White, i.e., open-mindedness.190  While that interest 
might not be served by restrictions aimed at the prior expression of 
a view on a pertinent legal issue, it may be served by a promise to 
adhere to that position—even one limited to statements made in the 
context of an election.191
But the court upheld an “as applied” challenge, concluding that 
the rule could not be applied to prohibit responses to a questionnaire 
that asked, not for commitments, but for a statement of position on 
legal issues.192  According to the district judge, “There is a very real 
distinction between a judge committing to an outcome before the 
case begins, which renders the proceeding an exercise in futility for 
(holding that a rule that governed speech and conduct of judges violated the 
First Amendment). 
 185. See, e.g., N.D. Family Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 
1024, 1037–42 (D.N.D. 2005). 
 186. See, e.g., Kan. Judicial Review v. Stout, 196 P.3d 1162 (Kan. 2008). 
 187. 490 F. Supp. 2d 968. 
 188. Id. at 975–77. 
 189. Id. at 975. 
 190. See id. at 975–76. 
 191. See id. at 976. 
 192. See id. at 976–77. 
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all involved, and a judge disclosing an opinion and predisposition 
before the case.”193  Setting forth one’s views without commitment “is 
nothing more than acknowledgment of the inescapable truth that 
thoughtful judicial minds are likely to have considered many issues 
and formed opinions on them prior to addressing the issue in the 
context of a case.”194
Although Duwe rejected a facial challenge to the state’s “pledges 
or promises” clause, it upheld a facial challenge to Wisconsin 
Supreme Court Rule 60.04(4)(f), which required a judge to recuse 
herself when she has made a public statement that “commits, or 
appears to commit, the judge with respect to . . . an issue in the 
proceeding [or a] controversy in the proceeding.”195  The use of the 
term “appears to commit” extended, or threatened to extend, 
application of the rule to the mere announcement of a position on a 
legal or political issue protected by White.196
Other courts have also struck down canons that prohibit 
statements that “commit or appear to commit” a candidate with 
respect to an issue or controversy.  In North Dakota Family Alliance, 
Inc. v. Bader,197 for example, a district court held that “[t]here is no 
real distinction between announcing one’s views on legal or political 
issues and making statements that commit, or ‘appear to commit,’ a 
judicial candidate with respect to cases, controversies, and issues 
that are likely to come before the court.”198  Bader also upheld a 
facial challenge to a canon prohibiting “pledges or promises” as 
well.199  However, although the court concluded that North Dakota 
had a compelling interest in ensuring impartiality toward parties, 
these clauses were too broad to serve that goal.200  Similarly, in 
Family Trust Foundation of Kentucky, Inc. v. Wolnitzek,201 the 
district court granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement 
of Kentucky’s  “commits or appears to commit” clauses.202  However, 
in the district judge’s view, the state could prohibit a judicial 
candidate from promising to rule in a certain way on an issue likely 
to face the court, but Kentucky’s restriction was not so limited and 
could not survive strict scrutiny.203  Two other courts have reached 
similar conclusions, although the decision below in each was 
 193. Id. at 975. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 977. 
 196. Id. 
 197. 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (D.N.D. 2005). 
 198. Id. at 1041. 
 199. Id. at 1038–42. 
 200. Id. at 1044. 
 201. 345 F. Supp. 2d 672 (E.D. Ky. 2004). 
 202. Id. at 711–12. 
 203. Id. at 704.  The Sixth Circuit declined to stay the injunction.  Family 
Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Ky. Judicial Conduct Comm’n, 388 F.3d 224 (6th 
Cir. 2004). 
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ultimately dismissed on appeal for lack of ripeness or for 
mootness.204
Like Duwe, at least one state court has upheld “pledges or 
promises” clauses through a narrowing construction.  In Kansas 
Judicial Review v. Stout,205 the Kansas Supreme Court upheld the 
state’s prohibition of a “pledges or promises” clause construing it in 
a way that did not prohibit a candidate from announcing his or her 
personal views on disputed questions.206  It adopted a similar 
construction of the “commit or appears to commit” clause stating 
that it prohibited only statements that bind a candidate to a 
particular disposition.207  However, shortly after White, the Florida 
Supreme Court,208 and the New York Court of Appeals209 applied 
such clauses without any readily apparent limiting construction.  
These cases will be discussed below. 
B. Speech Rights of Interested Parties 
White is instructive, but there is more.  The First Amendment 
protects not only the rights of candidates to speak, but also the right 
of third parties to be heard on issues that may be pertinent to a 
campaign during the election cycle.  In Federal Elections 
Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.,210 for example, the 
Court recognized a First Amendment right for corporations to 
engage in issue advocacy during an election.211  The Court 
recognized a broad right for persons to comment on matters of public 
interest—even during an election season and even when the 
communication mentions a candidate for office and has not been 
funded in accordance with campaign finance restrictions.212  In 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,213 the Court 
extended that right to independent advocacy for or against the 
election of a particular candidate.214
Both Citizens United and Wisconsin Right to Life have 
recognized that independent expenditures do not present the same 
potential for corruption as do campaign contributions.  Writing for 
 204. See, e.g., Kan. Judicial Review v. Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (D. Kan. 
2006) (enjoining pledges or promises, commits, and solicitation clauses), appeal 
dismissed, 562 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 2009); Alaska Right to Life Political Action 
Comm. v. Feldman, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (D. Alaska 2005) (striking “pledge or 
promise” and “commit or appears to commit” clauses as unconstitutional), 
vacated, 504 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 205. 196 P.3d 1162 (Kan. 2008). 
 206. Id. at 1172–74. 
 207. Id. at 1174–75. 
 208. See In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 85–89 (Fla. 2003). 
 209. See In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 5–8 (N.Y. 2003). 
 210. 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
 211. See id. at 469–82. 
 212. See generally Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449. 
 213. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 214. Id. 
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the majority in Citizens United, Justice Kennedy described the 
rationale behind the distinction: 
The Buckley Court explained that the potential for quid pro 
quo corruption distinguished direct contributions to candidates 
from independent expenditures.  The Court emphasized that 
“the independent expenditure ceiling . . . fails to serve any 
substantial governmental interest in stemming the reality or 
appearance of corruption in the electoral process,” because 
“[t]he absence of prearrangement and coordination . . . 
alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid 
pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.”215
Caperton, of course, found a due process duty of recusal based on 
independent expenditures.216  Nevertheless, Citizens United 
suggests the contradiction may be less stark than it may have 
appeared immediately after Caperton.  Given Justice Kennedy’s 
distinction between contributions and expenditures and his robust 
reaffirmation of the distinction in Citizens United, it seems unlikely 
that the Court’s longstanding distinction between contributions and 
independent expenditures is not pertinent in judicial elections and is 
not relevant in assessing the scope of Caperton.  Although—as we 
have seen—there are problems with this narrative about Caperton, 
Justice Kennedy appears to have seen Blankenship’s expenditures 
as both unusual and tantamount to contributions.217
The recognition of a broad right of independent groups and 
individuals to speak has two implications.  First, it suggests that the 
ability to police judicial independence through the restriction of 
candidate speech is limited.  If public criticism of judicial decisions 
exacerbates the majoritarian difficulty, regulation of candidate 
speech—either directly or through recusal—becomes dramatically 
underinclusive.  While one could argue that the independent 
statements of a candidate’s supporters can lead or contribute to a 
duty to recuse (the Gableman recusal motions, discussed above, 
make precisely that claim), this seems rather attenuated. 
Candidates have, by definition, no control over what independent 
supporters may say.218
 215. Id. at 901–02 (alternation in original) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47–48 (1976)). 
 216. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2259–67 (2009). 
 217. Kennedy repeatedly referred to Blankenship’s contributions: 
“Blankenship contributed some $3 million”; “[w]hether Blankenship’s campaign 
contributions were a necessary and sufficient cause of Benjamin’s victory is not 
the proper inquiry”; “[t]he temporal relationship between the campaign 
contributions, the justice’s election, and the pendency of the case is also 
critical”; “absent recusal, Justice Benjamin would review a judgment that cost 
his biggest donor’s company $50 million”; “Blankenship’s extraordinary 
contributions.”  Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2264–65. 
 218. One might argue that independent messages can support a duty to 
recuse only if the candidate does not disavow them.  It is unlikely, however, 
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Second, Caperton notwithstanding, the Court’s longstanding 
distinction of expenditures and contributions says something about 
the likelihood that expenditures will have an impact on a public 
official that might support the restriction of speech.  Whatever “debt 
of gratitude” or appearance of improper influence that they create 
has generally been insufficient to overcome First Amendment 
protections. 
C. Does Recusal Restrict Speech? 
It has been suggested that a constitutionally or statutorily 
mandated duty of recusal may be considerably broader than 
permissible restrictions on speech, i.e., it may be triggered by a 
relatively large amount of speech that is constitutionally 
protected.219  The speech engaged in and funded by Blankenship, 
after all, was certainly constitutionally protected.  Justice Kennedy 
joined the majority in Citizens United, Caperton, Wisconsin Right to 
Life, Inc., and White.220  Perhaps, robust protection for campaign 
speech by judicial candidates and their supporters—at least in his 
mind—does not mean that this constitutionally protected speech 
cannot result in a mandatory duty of recusal.  Indeed, concurring in 
White, Justice Kennedy wrote that states may “adopt recusal 
standards more rigorous than due process requires, and censure 
judges who violate these standards,” although they may not “censor 
what the people hear as they undertake to decide for themselves 
which candidate is most likely to be an exemplary judicial officer.”221  
He repeated that observation in Caperton itself.222  In Citizens 
United, he wrote, without explanation, that Caperton was “limited 
to the rule that the judge must be recused, not that the litigant’s 
political speech could be banned.”223
Clearly, due process may require recusal as a result of speech 
that is protected.  There is, to be sure, a “play in the joints” between 
the right to speak and the duty to recuse in which the former is not 
always immunized from the latter.  Nevertheless, the extent and 
nature of the right to speak ought to tell us something about the 
extent and nature of the duty to recuse.  To recognize a large “play 
in the joints” would be overly dismissive of the interests recognized 
by White and the campaign finance cases.  Just as with the 
that disavowal will have much impact on the public’s reaction to independently 
sponsored messages and that, therefore, disavowal will reduce whatever 
pressure the public places on a judge.  Nor is it clear that disavowal will 
dissuade independent supporters from spending money. 
 219. See infra notes 227–29 and accompanying text. 
 220. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 
2252; FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007); Republican Party of 
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
 221. White, 536 U.S. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 222. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267. 
 223. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910. 
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continuing viability of the distinction between expenditures and 
contributions, Justice Kennedy’s emphasis on the extraordinary 
nature of the Caperton facts may prove to be important.  As noted 
above, Kennedy’s Caperton opinion tended to elide the distinction 
between contributions and expenditures—a distinction that Justice 
Kennedy strongly reaffirmed in Citizens United.  He joined the 
White majority, and it seems unlikely that he believes that 
aggressive recusal requirements do not restrict speech. 
In Davis v. Federal Election Commission,224 the Court, with 
Justice Kennedy in the majority, struck down a federal statute that 
increased campaign contribution limits and lifted the cap on 
coordinated party expenditures for candidates who face a self-
financing opponent whose spending has exceeded a specified 
amount.225  This so-called millionaire’s amendment was held to 
burden the exercise of the self-financing candidate’s right to 
advocate for her own election.226  The burden was, of course, a 
benefit to the opponent, rendering her own speech less effective.  If 
the price of candidate or third-party speech on an issue is 
disqualification of a judge from ever addressing that issue, then it 
would seem that the right to speak has been effectively undermined.  
Davis cautions against burdening the free speech rights of 
candidates, even in indirect ways. 
Duwe is also instructive.  In passing on the constitutionality of 
Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule 60.04(4)(f), the court held that the 
fact that these provisions did not purport to prohibit restricted 
speech but only to require recusal did not render White inapplicable: 
While it is true that the recusal requirement is not a direct 
regulation of speech, the chilling effect on judicial candidates 
is likely to be the same.  Although a candidate would not fear 
immediate repercussions from the speech, the candidate would 
be equally dissuaded from speaking by the knowledge that 
recusal would be mandated in any case raising an issue on 
which he or she announced a position.227
A broad reading of Caperton would permit a candidate or his 
supporters to exercise their right to speak on political and legal 
issues only at the expense of the candidate being unable to address 
those issues if elected.  The impact is likely to be the suppression of 
speech.  It is, in fact, the objective of such a reading.  Requiring 
recusal when a candidate has announced his or her views would be, 
in the view of Professor Roy Schotland, “an inspired step.”228  It 
 224. 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008). 
 225. Id. at 2770–72. 
 226. Id. at 2766, 2772. 
 227. Duwe v. Alexander, 490 F. Supp. 2d 968, 977 (W.D. Wis. 2007). 
 228. Roy A. Schotland, To the Endangered Species List, Add: Nonpartisan 
Judicial Elections, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1397, 1419–20 (2003); accord Joseph 
E. Lambert, Contestable Judicial Elections: Maintaining Respectability in the 
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would provide candidates cover to say that “I know what you’d like 
me to say, but if I go into that then I’ll be unable to sit in just the 
cases you care about most.”229
The impact of a broad recusal right, then, would tend to inhibit 
or limit interested parties’ participation in judicial elections.  While 
some might suggest that a limitation is just what is needed, driving 
out the participation of groups and individuals affected by the courts 
is unlikely to lead to Athenian democracy but to a process 
dominated by incumbents, media, and the bar.  This is impossible to 
reconcile with White except in the most formalist and didactic of 
ways—you can speak, but, if you do, your speech and what it 
conveys to voters will become irrelevant.  This is, in White’s sense, to 
deny voters the information that they need to make an intelligent 
choice between candidates. 
Broad recusal rights are likely, moreover, to lead to what the 
Caperton minority feared and Justice Kennedy said would not (and, 
at least implicitly, should not) happen: strategic attempts to remove 
judges thought to be unfavorable to a litigant’s position.230  Although 
this may be manageable at the level of a trial court, it is problematic 
for multimember appellate courts in which voters have presumably 
elected each judge to sit, insofar as is possible, on all cases.  Recusal, 
particularly in courts of last resort, frustrates the public will and 
impedes the development of the law.  Even when state law provides 
for the appointment of a replacement, the public’s choice of judges—
often on issues of great public importance—is frustrated. 
Although the same cases that struck down clauses prohibiting 
“pledges or promises” or statements that “commit or appear to 
commit” candidates to a particular position have upheld canons 
requiring recusal when, among other things, a “judge’s impartiality 
could reasonably be questioned,” they do not describe what 
circumstances require recusal or when recusal can be required as a 
result of protected speech.  If, as seems to be the case, speech that 
cannot be restricted may lead to recusal, it is necessary to attend to 
the framework of White and the campaign finance cases. 
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT FOR CAPERTON 
As noted above, the Caperton majority and the dissent differed 
on the importance of announcing a well-defined standard that would 
guide application of what is likely to be seen as a broader due 
Post-White Era, 94 KY. L.J. 1, 14 (2005) (warning of the dangers of mandatory 
recusal); Thomas R. Phillips & Karlene Dunn Poll, Free Speech for Judges and 
Fair Appeals for Litigants: Judicial Recusal in a Post-White World, 55 DRAKE L. 
REV. 691, 709 (2007) (“Finally, the existence of a recusal process will give 
judicial candidates ‘cover’ to avoid making promises or commitments during 
campaigns in particular or during the course of the judicial service.”). 
 229. Schotland, supra note 228, at 1420. 
 230. See Rotunda, supra note 60, at 265. 
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process right to (and duty of) recusal.  Chief Justice Roberts 
predicted mischief as lawyers play the Caperton card,231 while 
Justice Kennedy thought it sufficient unto the day to say that, 
whatever the Due Process Clause might require in another case, it 
called for the recusal of Justice Benjamin in the matter before the 
Court.232
As Professor Karlan observes, this division reflects a long-
running debate over the manner in which courts should monitor the 
political process: 
Caperton ties into a longstanding methodological debate over 
judicial intervention in the political process.  On the one hand, 
theories of representation reinforcement, most notably John 
Hart Ely’s, have identified an antientrenchment rationale for 
judicial review: a court actually promotes democracy when it 
overturns decisions made by political insiders stacking the 
deck and “choking off the channels of political change to 
ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out.”  On 
the other hand, fear of embroiling the judiciary in the “political 
thicket” creates strong pressure for the Supreme Court to 
intervene only when it can identify and articulate an objective 
test for adjudicating politics-related claims.233
For example, Professor Lessig, otherwise sympathetic to 
Caperton and concerned about the impact of campaign contributions 
and expenditures on judicial impartiality, also expresses concern 
about the decision’s fidelity to the judicial role.234  Lessig questions 
whether the decision will weaken the institution of the judiciary by 
“unnecessarily forcing it” to make “judgments that cannot help but 
appear political, or because the rule it seeks to implement is 
predictably unadministratable[.]”235  These risks, he says, were 
“dramatically remarked” by Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent.236
As noted earlier, some argue that Caperton motions will be 
rare,237 but, as Professor Karlan observes, the impact of Caperton is 
not limited to—and may not even be principally a result of—
adjudicated recusal motions.238  Recusal motions will be directed, at 
least in the first instance, to the judge whose impartiality is 
questioned and the federal review will be confined to the Supreme 
Court, limiting the opportunity for clarification of just what due 
 231. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267–75 (2009) 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 232. Id. at 2262–65 (majority opinion). 
 233. Karlan, supra note 53, at 95 (footnotes omitted). 
 234. See Lessig, supra note 75, at 113. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 114. 
 237. See, e.g., Green, supra note 56, at 233. 
 238. Karlan, supra note 53, at 100–01. 
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process requires.239  This, in my view, underscores, rather than 
diminishes, the need for clear direction.  If the Caperton rule is 
likely to be a machine that runs off itself, then greater clarity as to 
its proper use is in order. 
In a forthcoming paper, Professors Andrey Spektor and Michael 
Zuckerman argue that the tension between a strong due process 
imperative for recusal and the speech rights of judicial candidates 
and their supporters calls for a limit on Caperton and suggest using 
the balancing test announced in Matthews v. Eldridge.240  Although 
Matthews certainly describes, in a fashion, what one must do to 
resolve this tension, standing alone, it, like most “balancing tests,” is 
characterized by an inclusivity that is both a virtue and vice.  A 
direction to consider all pertinent factors can be almost no direction 
at all.241  It is my belief that the Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence can tell us something about how the scales will tip. 
A. Candidate Speech 
1. Statement of Position on Legal or Political Issues 
One thing seems easy.  The expression of a position on a legal 
issue—at least as long as it does not rise to the level of a “promise” 
or “pledge”—is not only constitutionally protected, but does not, 
given White, give rise to the type of bias that the state has an 
interest in preventing.  Having a view on a legal or political issue is 
not the type of bias with which the state may concern itself.242  The 
fact that a judge might feel pressure to rule in a way that is 
consistent with his earlier stated position or with public opinion 
does not give rise to due process concerns of sufficient gravity to 
justify the restriction of speech.243
But perhaps it’s not so easy.  Some have argued—and some 
 239. Id. at 100. 
 240. Andrey Spektor & Michael Zuckerman, Judicial Recusal & Expanding 
Notions of Due Process, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 
31–42), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=1564385.  The Matthews test requires a balancing of: 
[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail. 
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 241. Cf. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (proclaiming that the balancing test set forth by 
the Court in the case “is more like judging whether a particular line is longer 
than a particular rock is heavy”). 
 242. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 777–78 (2002). 
 243. See id. at 782–83. 
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post-White decisions have held—that a judge ought not “promise” to 
rule in a particular way.244  The Kansas Supreme Court 
distinguishes between a question that asks “[w]hat is your stance on 
abortion?” and “[d]o you vow to overturn Roe v. Wade?”245  The 
former would likely be “a permissible pronouncement of a personal 
view on a disputed legal issue,” while the latter would 
“impermissibly bind a candidate to a particular legal action.”246  
While this is fair enough, it masks a variety of intermediate 
approaches.  What of a candidate who criticizes Roe or who 
announces that, in her view, the Constitution does not protect a 
right of privacy or that such a right ought not to extend to abortion?  
White would seem to compel the conclusion that this does not 
constitute impermissible bias. 
One might distinguish between statements of law—e.g., a claim 
that sexual orientation ought to be considered a suspect 
classification—and legal conclusions that presumably require 
attention to findings of fact that a candidate could not have made—
e.g., an expression of the view that a state’s method of financing 
schools unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of race (when 
such a conclusion requires factual inquiries as to intent or impact) 
or a commitment to “always” sentence sexual offenders to the 
maximum term of confinement when state law requires 
consideration of mitigating factors.  Thus, while a candidate may, as 
one commentator has suggested, promise to give harsher, or perhaps 
even higher, sentences for drunk drivers,247 she may not do so in a 
way that suggests she will not consider all that sentencing law 
requires. 
And perhaps candidates must avoid the language of promise or 
commitment.248  For Justice Ginsburg, this was a distinction without 
a difference,249 but it may serve the state’s interest in preserving 
open-mindedness—not in the sense of having no preconceptions—
but of being open to persuasion.  Although Justice Ginsburg thought 
this easily evaded, the very need for a judge to remain committed to 
listen may underscore institutional constraints related to opinion 
writing and the consideration of evidence and arguments. 
2. Statements of Bias Against Classes of Litigants 
Although White quite clearly suggests that statements of a 
candidate’s legal or political views do not create due process 
 244. See, e.g., In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 87 (Fla. 2003); Rachel Paine 
Caufield, In the Wake of White: How States Are Responding to Republican Party 
of Minnesota v. White and How Judicial Elections Are Changing, 38 AKRON L. 
REV. 625 (2005). 
 245. Kan. Judicial Review v. Stout, 196 P.3d 1162, 1176 (Kan. 2008). 
 246. Id. 
 247. Friedland, supra note 169, at 596. 
 248. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 780 (2002). 
 249. Id. at 819–20 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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problems,250 it remains the case that bias against a litigant—at least 
based on extra record sources—might.  To what extent can this 
interest be expanded to a class of litigants?  There are certainly 
ways in which it can be.  Bias against a “suspect class” or on a 
“suspect basis”—i.e., race, gender, ethnicity, religion—might require 
recusal.  The Court has, for example, said that a judge’s statement 
that “‘[o]ne must have a very judicial mind, indeed, not [to be] 
prejudiced against the German Americans’ because their ‘hearts are 
reeking with disloyalty’”251 constituted disqualifying bias (albeit on a 
statutory basis) in an espionage case against ethnic Germans.252  
More recently, a judge was disciplined for what were regarded to be 
biased statements against white people.253
But again, the matter is not simple.  The Mississippi Supreme 
Court, for example, refused to discipline a judge who wrote a letter 
to a newspaper in which he said that “gays and lesbians should be 
put in some type of mental institute” and who told a radio 
interviewer that homosexuality was a disease that required 
treatment, rather than punishment.254  The judge had claimed that 
these views were rooted in his Christian beliefs, and the court 
indeed found them to be constitutionally protected.255  The court 
observed (without addressing the merits) that the judge would 
“doubtless face a recusal motion from every gay and lesbian citizen 
who visits his court.”256
It may be easy to conclude that there would be a duty for this 
judge to recuse himself from matters involving gay or lesbian 
litigants, but it is not hard to imagine a more difficult case, such as 
a statement on the part of a judge opposing same-sex marriage or 
affirming “traditional” sexual morality.  One is also reminded of our 
ongoing debates over whether certain statements and positions are 
implicitly racist.257  In my view, this difficulty, while real, is unlikely 
to prove unmanageable.  We can expect most judges to stay well 
clear of the line, and it is, in any event, a line that courts—who must 
often address allegations of discriminatory intent—have 
 250. Id. at 776–78. 
 251. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 28 (1921)). 
 252. Berger, 255 U.S. at 36. 
 253. Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Osborne, 11 So. 3d 107, 109, 
118 (Miss. 2009) (quoting Judge Osborne as follows: “White folks don’t praise 
you unless you’re a damn fool.  Unless they think they can use you.  If you have 
your own mind and know what you’re doing, they don’t want you around.”). 
 254. Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Wilkerson, 876 So. 2d 1006, 
1008–09, 1016 (Miss. 2004). 
 255. Id. at 1013–16. 
 256. Id. at 1015. 
 257. Indeed, some have argued that certain ads at issue in the Gableman 
recusal motions were implicitly racist.  See Felicia Thomas-Lynn, NAACP 
Decries Campaign Ad, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Mar. 18, 2008), 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/29497054.html. 
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traditionally policed. 
A larger problem is the potential for recasting statements of 
position as statements of bias.  Criminal defendants—or, for that 
matter, defendants in products liability cases—often face a common 
set of legal issues on which jurists may reasonably differ.  Judges 
may differ in their assessments of the rights claims of defendants 
based on interpretive method, assumptions regarding the way in 
which power is exercised in society, differences in confidence 
regarding the adjudicative process, and varying judgments about 
the proper balance to be struck between collective security and 
individual liberty.  Judges’ differing views on products liability may 
be rooted in disagreements concerning the efficacy of markets or the 
capacity of the legal system to efficiently allocate the costs of 
injuries without creating economic inefficiency.  These sound 
suspiciously like the differing perspectives on legal and political 
issues that do not create a constitutionally significant risk of 
impartiality. 
But complications will inevitably arise from the nature of 
political speech.  A candidate or her supporters are unlikely to 
produce a thirty-second spot in which the candidate says that, in her 
view, courts have gone beyond the original meaning and intent of 
the protection against self-incrimination and struck an improper 
balance between the desire to ensure voluntary confessions and the 
needs of effective law enforcement.  In campaign ads directed 
toward voters whose understandings and (perhaps more 
importantly) attention spans are limited, she is likely to say 
something more like that the court has coddled criminals and that 
she will be tougher.  A candidate will probably not explain that her 
opponent has failed to appreciate the need to allocate the cost of 
injuries caused by prescription medicines to drug manufacturers so 
that they can be spread across all users.  She may well say that he is 
“in the pocket” of the drug companies. 
One might argue that such statements constitute bias in White’s 
first sense, i.e., they create the appearance of bias against a class of 
litigants rather than a predisposition toward a particular legal 
position.  If we believe that recusal is a more limited restriction on 
speech than discipline, then it would certainly seem that recusal is 
both a permissible—and potentially constitutionally mandated—
remedy for statements that are claimed to express an impermissible 
potential for bias against a class of litigants, e.g., claims of bias 
against criminal defendants. 
There is some authority for this.  In a pre-White case, a judge 
was disciplined (albeit only with a warning) for stating that he was 
“very tough on crimes” when there are victims who have been 
physically harmed and that he had “no feelings for the criminal.”258  
 258. See Bruce Hight, Judge Violated Conduct Code, Panel Decides, AUSTIN 
AM. STATESMAN, Jan. 31, 2001, at B1 (describing Texas Court of Criminal 
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In a post-White matter, a judge was disciplined for distributing 
leaflets that stated, “your police officers expect judges to take their 
testimony seriously and to help law enforcement by putting 
criminals where they belong . . . behind bars!” and “[a]bove all else, 
[the candidate] identifies with the victims of crime.”259  In another 
case, a judge was publicly censured for saying that “[w]e need a city 
court judge who will work together with our local police department 
to help return Lockport to the city it once was,” and suggesting that 
a judge should use bail and sentencing to deter crime.260
But this seems to go too far.  In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. 
Lavoie, for example, the Court concluded that allegations of a 
judge’s general hostility toward insurance companies did not compel 
his recusal.261  “[O]nly in the most extreme of cases,” it observed, 
“would disqualification [for bias or prejudice] be constitutionally 
required.”262  Thirty-second ads criticizing a decision excluding 
evidence or failing to uphold a verdict in favor of a seriously injured 
plaintiff will leave much unsaid.  But that is in the nature of 
politics, and the ads are constitutionally protected, given a state’s 
choice to elect judges and White’s limitation of the state interest in 
preventing bias.  To require a judge who, in White’s language, is 
“communicating relevant information to voters during an election” 
from sitting on cases in which that “relevant information” matters 
would render White’s protection of campaign speech for judicial 
candidates chimerical and would be wholly inconsistent with White’s 
foundational premises concerning the judicial role. 
3. Statements of Refusal To Follow the Law 
An additional (and perhaps more serious) objection to much 
judicial campaign speech—particularly promises to be “tough on 
crime”—is that it rarely addresses the legal issues that ought to 
control the disposition of cases.  Judges are castigated for using 
“loopholes” to release defendants without regard to the strength or 
weakness of the defendants’ claims.263  That the “loophole” may have 
Appeals Judge Tom Price’s campaign statements). 
 259. In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 87–89 (Fla. 2003) (alteration in original) 
(finding judge violated state code of judicial conduct and punishing her with 
censure and fine). 
 260. In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 3–5 (N.Y. 2003).  The candidate also sent 
out a letter to law enforcement personnel asking for their support in “put[ting] 
a real prosecutor on the bench,” and stating that “[w]e need a judge who will 
assist our law enforcement officers as they aggressively work towards cleaning 
up our city streets.”  Id. at 2. 
 261. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820–21 (1986). 
 262. Id. at 821. 
 263. See Andrew Clevenger, Roane Judge Dismisses Priest’s 1991 
Molestation Charges, CHARLESTON GAZETTE (Aug. 30, 2010), 
http://wvgazette.com/News/201008300958 (“[I]t’s important that suspected child 
predators not walk free because of legal technicalities.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
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consisted of an important constitutional guarantee or that the result 
was mandated by decisions of the United States Supreme Court is 
unlikely to become part of the broad public debate.  Terms like 
“loophole” become shorthand for a legal position that has an 
undesired consequence and, although the speaker may have 
something more than a consequentialist objection, whatever that is 
goes unexplained.  In this, judicial campaigns reflect political 
advertising in general, which is characterized by gross 
oversimplification and, when addressing the positions of an 
opponent, by bad faith.  If sufficiently egregious, this could lead to a 
probability of bias sufficient to warrant recusal. 
The controversy concerning the recusal of Wisconsin Supreme 
Court Justice Michael Gableman illustrates the problem.  The 
Gableman campaign ran a much-criticized ad attacking his 
opponent, incumbent Justice Louis Butler, for representing a 
convicted rapist.264  The ad, now the subject of a disciplinary 
proceeding against Justice Gableman,265 said that “Butler found a 
loophole” and the rapist went on to offend again.266  In fact, the 
“loophole” that Butler found was held to be harmless error and his 
client offended only after serving a prison term.267  Gableman 
generally promised to be tough on crime, and both he and 
independent supporters repeatedly referred to the fact that Butler 
had been a public defender and had earned the nickname “Loophole 
 264. The audio text of the ad was as follows: 
Unbelievable.  Shadowy special interests supporting Louis Butler are 
attacking Judge Michael Gableman.  It’s not true!  Judge, District 
Attorney Michael Gableman has committed his life to locking up 
criminals to keep families safe—putting child molesters behind bars 
for over one hundred years.  Louis Butler worked to put criminals on 
the street.  Like Reuben Lee Mitchell, who raped an eleven-year-old 
girl with learning disabilities.  Butler found a loophole.  Mitchell went 
on to molest another child.  Can Wisconsin families feel safe with 
Louis Butler on the Supreme Court? 
GreaterWisComm, Gableman Attack Ad, YOUTUBE (Mar. 30, 2010), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8GquEW0XKcA. 
 265. A three-judge panel recommended that the complaint be dismissed.  See 
Wis. Judicial Comm. v. Gableman (In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against the Honorable Michael J. Gableman), No. 2008AP2458-J, at 3–4 (Wis. 
June 30, 2010).  That recommendation is now before the entire Wisconsin 
Supreme Court.  In a possibly ironic twist, Justice Gableman moved to recuse 
Justice Patrick Crooks for statements made in his writing in the case 
addressing the recusal motions. Justice Crooks denied the motion.  Patrick 
Marley, Justice Crooks To Stay on Gableman Ethics Case, MILWAUKEE-WIS. J., 
SENTINEL (Mar. 29, 2010), http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/89463092 
.html. 
 266. Bill Lueders, Gableman—Unfit for Any Office, ISTHMUS: THE DAILY 
PAGE (Mar. 27, 2008), http://www.thedailypage.com/isthmus/article.php 
?article=22072. 
 267. Marcia Coyle, Judicial Campaign Speech Case May Be Destined for 
Supreme Court, LAW.COM (Sept. 22, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp 
?id=1202433962977. 
W04_ESENBERG 11/11/2010  11:44:12 PM 
2010] CAPERTON AND ITS LIMITS 1333 
 
Louie.”268
The recusal motions have argued that these ads reflect a 
prejudice against a specific class of litigants—criminal defendants.269  
It is bias in White’s first sense and can certainly form the basis for 
recusal.  Although I think the ad was misleading and unfair, I am 
not convinced that it warrants recusal.  “Tough-on-crime” 
campaigning reflects, however crudely, a normative position that 
courts have used their discretion in a way that provides too much 
protection to criminal defendants.  Judges do differ on such 
questions and, after White, they are entitled to communicate those 
differences to the voters. 
If there is a problem with tough-on-crime campaigning, it is 
that it suggests that a judge won’t follow the law, i.e., that a judge 
will rule against criminal defendants regardless of what the law 
requires.  But given the limits and mores of campaigning, a duty to 
recuse would seem to require an extraordinarily direct and broad 
statement of bias against defendants as a class.  At minimum, the 
key may be whether a statement can be read as a statement of legal 
position (“my opponents sentences are too light,” or even “my 
opponent unnecessarily finds loopholes that allow criminals to go 
free”) as opposed to being a clear statement of bias (“the testimony 
of law enforcement officers should be believed”) or of a refusal to 
consider what the law may require to be taken into account (“I have 
no feeling for the criminal”).270
B. Campaign Support and Recusal 
1. Expenditures Are of Less Concern Than Are Contributions 
Although Caperton involved, for the most part, independent 
expenditures,271 and White concerned candidate speech,272 robust 
constitutional protection of campaign speech is not limited to 
candidates.  It will presumably take an extraordinary and extreme 
independent effort to lead to a duty of recusal.  As noted above, the 
Court has long distinguished between expenditures and 
contributions, holding that the former does not present the same 
 268. Hijacking Justice 2008: Issue Ads in the 2008 Supreme Court 
Campaign, WIS. DEMOCRACY CAMPAIGN (Feb. 22, 2008), http://www.wisdc.org 
/hijackjustice08issueads.php. 
 269. See, e.g., Motion for Recusal of the Honorable Michael Gableman on 
Constitutional Grounds at 28, State v. Carter, No. 2006AP1811-CR (Wis. 2009), 
available at http://www.wisspd.org/html/appellate/CCRM.pdf. 
 270. Although I criticized the Mitchell ad at the time it was aired, see Rick 
Esenberg, Supreme Court Ads, SHARK & SHEPHERD (Mar. 17, 2008, 7:40 PM), 
http://sharkandshepherd.blogspot.com/2008/03/supreme-court-ads.html, I am 
not persuaded that it, even in combination with other ads and communications 
in the race, amounts to such a statement of bias. 
 271. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257 (2009). 
 272. See generally Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
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potential for actual or apparent corruption.273  Although Justice 
Kennedy repeatedly elided the distinction between contributions 
and expenditures in Caperton,274 the recent reaffirmation in Citizens 
United of the notion that “independent expenditures, including 
those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the 
appearance of corruption”275 suggests that independent expenditures 
ought to be less likely to lead to a duty of recusal. 
Smith and Hoersting argue that the interest in preventing 
actual or apparent judicial bias is a more narrow interest than the 
interest in preventing the corruption—or its appearance—thought to 
justify restrictions on campaign expenditures.276  Bias, they say, 
requires “a direct, substantial, personal or pecuniary interest in 
reaching a conclusion against [a litigant in a] case.”277  Corruption, 
they argue, is a necessarily broader concept because bribery is 
already illegal.278  Although the state apparently has an interest in 
preventing the appearance of an improper quid pro quo, they argue 
that, if independent expenditures cannot give rise to the appearance 
of corruption, then such expenditures certainly cannot give rise to 
the appearance of bias.279
It is not clear, after Caperton, that disqualifying judicial bias is 
a narrower concept than the type of corruption thought to support 
restrictions on campaign contributions in general.  But the “debt of 
gratitude” that may be owed to, at least, the support of an 
independent group representing a particular interest or point of 
view (as opposed to, as Justice Kennedy seemed to see it, being 
virtually an alter ego of a particular party with a private interest) is 
indistinguishable from the type of pressure that may flow from a 
judge’s recognition of who supports her and how those supporters’ 
behavior may impact future elections. 
2. The Type of Party 
There are at least two issues here.  The first is whether an 
interested party might not be the litigant, but instead some 
organization or aggregate of organizations or individuals with an 
interest in the outcome of a case.  Assume, for example, that a 
business organization or association of trial lawyers has strongly 
supported a particular party.  It is likely that there is—or will be—a 
case in which such an organization is interested.  The difficulty with 
 273. See, e.g., FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 
480, 491 & n.3 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47–48 (1976). 
 274. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 263–64. 
 275. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 884 (2010). 
 276. Hoersting & Smith, supra note 52, at 340. 
 277. Id. at 328 (alteration in original) (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 
523 (1927)) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. 
Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 822 (1986). 
 278. Hoersting & Smith, supra note 52, at 340. 
 279. See id. at 340–41. 
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requiring recusal in such cases is that it is a principle that is at war 
with judicial elections.  If a candidate has been strongly supported 
by individual trial lawyers or business organizations in a sufficient 
amount, there is no reason to think that the “debt of gratitude” will 
be any less compelling than would be support from an organized 
association of trial lawyers or businesses.  If that’s right, then the 
principle turns out to be an admonition against ruling on a case in 
which an interest group that has strongly supported a candidate has 
an interest.  Again, this seems inconsistent with the rule from 
White: the view that the mere fact that a decision may have political 
consequences does not create due process concerns of sufficient 
gravity to justify the restriction of speech. 
A more limited duty would presumably turn on the amount of 
support provided.  But interest groups are more likely to be able to 
provide large amounts of support.  Indeed, in Caperton itself, trial 
lawyers were able to spend an amount that was less than, but 
comparable to, the putatively extraordinary levels of support 
provided by Blankenship.280  More fundamentally, that support is 
likely to be based on a candidate’s perceived sympathy for a view of 
the law favored by the interest group.  The form of bias likely to 
arise from interest-group support, then, is likely to be a perceived 
inclination toward a particular legal or political position.  As we 
have seen, such an interest is not sufficiently compelling or 
threatening to due process to support a duty of recusal.  It seems 
likely that recusal based on independent expenditures will—or 
should be—limited to large expenditures by individual parties with 
a particular matter that is pending or imminent. 
3. Type of Support 
In theory, there is no reason that endorsements—particularly 
by a large group—cannot create the same type of “debt of gratitude” 
that was of concern in Caperton.  Ironically, the value of such 
endorsements may become more substantial if mandatory recusal or 
other limitations on campaign expenditures reduces the ability of 
individuals and groups to directly support or engage in campaign 
communication.  The “signaling” effect of endorsements (along with 
the organizational support that many organizations can provide, 
including mobilization of their own members) will become more 
important.  Certainly, this type of support can lead to feelings of a 
“debt of gratitude” or to an incentive to rule in a particular way to 
keep or obtain such support.  Indeed, the literature suggests that 
endorsements and organizational support are critical in low-turnout, 
low-salience elections.281
 280. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2274 (2009). 
 281. See, e.g., Charles Kuffner, Analyzing the Republican Judicial 
Primaries, KUFF’S WORLD (May 7, 2010), http://blogs.chron.com/kuffsworld 
/2010/05/analyzing_the_republican_judic.html; Charles Kuffner, Another 
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As with expenditures, there is no reason to limit the potential 
for due process recusal to circumstances in which an interested 
litigant supported a judge.  The potential for apparent impropriety 
or an unacceptable probability of bias is just as likely to stem from 
opposition to a judge as from support for a judge.  In addition, if 
First Amendment concerns are not thought to place significant 
restrictions on Caperton recusal, there is no reason to believe that a 
duty of recusal cannot flow from media endorsements in cases in 
which an endorsing media entity is interested or, depending on how 
broadly we define an “interest,” is one in which it has taken a 
position. 
But to recognize Caperton recusal in such cases would be wholly 
inconsistent with the framework suggested here.  The fact that 
Caperton could be read to apply in such instances further supports 
the need for a limited reading of its scope. 
4. Imminence of Case 
One final question might relate to whether the case in which 
recusal is sought was imminent or anticipated at the time that the 
campaign support was provided or that the communications were 
made.  It would seem that the appearance of impropriety is 
strongest when a party who has provided campaign support knew or 
reasonably anticipated an important case coming before the court.282  
In the absence of such a case, the support looks more like 
generalized political support that ought not to form the basis for a 
duty to recuse.  This is less clear with campaign speech that either 
evinces an impermissible bias against a particular party or group or 
a refusal to apply the law.  While the imminence of a case may 
contribute to the appearance of a quid pro quo or “debt of gratitude,” 
the shelf life of an expression of impermissible bias would seem to be 
longer. 
CONCLUSION 
If, as Chief Justice Roberts suggested in dissent, Caperton is a 
hard case that made bad law,283 the remedy lies within the Court’s 
own recent jurisprudence regarding the relationship between 
judicial elections and judicial independence and the First 
Amendment rights of citizens to participate in the electoral process.  
It is these cases, and not the unusual nature of Caperton itself, that 
provide the limits that the Caperton majority did not. 
Analysis of the Democratic Judicial Primaries, OFF THE KUFF (Apr. 6, 2010), 
http://offthekuff.com/wp/?p=27265. 
 282. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2264 (“The temporal relationship between 
the campaign contributions, the justice’s election, and the pendency of the case 
is also critical.”). 
 283. Id. at 2272 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
